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I
INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy and regulation have grown together. Railroad regulation, one
of the earliest manifestations of the modern regulatory state,' was the product
of the growth and power of the railroad industry. When the railroad industry
fell upon hard times, it provided the first important test of the relationship
between insolvency proceedings and regulation. The modern corporate
reorganization originated in equity receiverships spawned by failing
railroads.2 These receiverships were later formalized under bankruptcy
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After completion of this article, the author, at the request of a public interest group, testified
before the New Orleans City Council in rate proceedings covering New Orleans Public Service Inc.
The testimony, which consisted of this article and a supplementary statement, was to the effect that a
regulatory body otherwise inclined to deny a rate increase ought not grant the increase merely
because it fears denial would push the utility into bankruptcy.
1. Congress established what has been called the first modern regulatory agency, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, to regulate railroads. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (1887)
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1982)). See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1
(1982); PROPHETS OF REGULATION 1-79 (T. McCraw ed. 1984) (biographical perspective on the
history of railroad regulation).
2. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No.
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 256-83 (1973); G. GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 430, at 606-07 (1935).
An 1845 Georgia state court case may have been the first railroad equity receivership. The court
ordered the sale of properties of a Georgia railroad with 100 miles of line, free of debts incurred
prior to the sale, and "distribution of the proceeds among the creditors, according to the priority of
their claims." Lasdon, The Evolution of RailroadReorganization, 88 BANKING L.J. 3, 6 (1971). In Davis v.
Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 447, 453 (1872), a case in which a railroad receiver was a party, Justice
Swayne's opinion for the Court states,
It is not unusual for courts of equity to put [receivers] in charge of the railroads of companies
which have fallen into financial embarrassment, and to require them to operate such roads, until
the difficulties are removed, or such arrangements are made that the roads can be sold with the
least sacrifice of the interests of those concerned.
The Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway is reported to have been, in 1884, the first American railway
to ask a federal court to appoint receivers to avoid the fragmentation of the line that would result
from foreclosures under its mortgages, Lasdon, supra, at 7, a report seemingly at odds with Justice
Swayne's statement. The Supreme Court approved the practice of appointing receivers for a
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reorganization statutes.3 Since the first financial failure of a regulated
railroad, there has been a need to coordinate bankruptcy and regulation.
Recent developments in the utility industry highlight that need. Expensive
nuclear power plant construction projects 4 have brought several regulated
utilities to the brink of bankruptcy. 5 But questions about bankruptcyregulatory interaction reach beyond nuclear power's cost and safety
problems. A utility that constructs a coal plant at excessive cost or misreads
6
demand for its product may be a candidate for chapter 11 reorganization.
An inner city gas company with a declining rate base, a water company in
need of expensive equipment, and a telephone company faced with
competing technologies each faces problems that could trigger a
consideration of bankruptcy as an alternative to large rate increases.
Questions about the role of regulation in bankruptcy also arise in less
regulated industries. In 1984, a furor accompanied the Supreme Court's
effort to reconcile the needs of a reorganizing debtor with the rights of the
debtor's workers under the National Labor Relations Act. 7 Longstanding
tension divides the needs of a bankruptcy reorganization and the securities
laws.8 Some debtors' rehabilitation efforts may bejeopardized by pension law
regulation or by environmental law restrictions. 9
The legal system focuses on these issues as isolated, unusual phenomena.
Bankruptcy itself is regarded as an exception to the norm. It is simply bad
regulated toll bridge. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 38 (1858). See G.
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 129 n.28 (1977).
3. See W. BLUM & S. KAPLAN, CORPORATE ADJUSTMENTS AND REORGANIZATIONS 221-22 (1976).
For problems with the equity receivership, see Lasdon, supra note 2, at 9-10.
4. Between 1972 and 1982, 100 nuclear power plant cancellations resulted in losses of about
$10 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORM. ADMIN., NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS:
CAUSES, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES X (1983); Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984). Fifteen cancellations in 1983 and
1984 resulted in further losses of $11 billion. Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric
Utilities and Their Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 302 n.l 1 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Generators of Bankruptcy: Some UtilitiesAre Approaching the Brink, TIME, July 23, 1984, at
81; Flaschen & Reilly, Bankruptcy Analysis of a Financially-TroubledElectric Utility, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J.
135, 136 (1985); Pierce, supra note 4, at 498.
6. From 1976 to 1984, 75 coal-fired power plants were cancelled. L. BROWN, STATE OF THE
WORLD--1986, at 100 (Table 6-1). In 1983, there were 21 coal plant cancellations and 6 nuclear
plant cancellations. In 1984, there were 18 coal plant cancellations and 8 nuclear plant cancellations.
The cancelled megawatt capacity for the two years was 14,477 for coal plants and 15,078 for nuclear
plants. Id.
Kentucky's Big Rivers Electric Cooperative is in financial difficulty as the result of its construction
of a large coal-burning generating plant "for which there's no market." Public Power Broker,
BARRON'S, Jan. 28, 1985, at 9. See also In re Montana Power Co., 61 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 177
(Mont. Pub. Dep't Serv. Reg. 1984) (denying rate increase to recover costs associated with Colstrip
Unit 3 coal plant), reconsideration ordered, 68 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 521 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1985).

7. In re Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
8. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370-73, 403-07 (1977). The nature of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's right to participate in a bankruptcy reorganization has been
particularly important. See, e.g., Wall St.J., Dec. 10, 1985, at 8, col. I (SEC trying to force Manville to
hold annual meeting while in bankruptcy).

9. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986); Novikoff&
Polebaum, Pension-RelatedClaims in Bankruptcy Code Cases, 40 Bus. LAW. 373 (1985). See generally In re

White Farm Equip. Co., 42 Bankr. 1005 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
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luck for the system when a bankrupt debtor is subject to a detailed regulatory
scheme. But bankruptcy is a common event' 0 and regulation is everywhere."
Bankruptcy of any substantial entity may require considering how
nonbankruptcy regulation should apply. Bankruptcy's role in dealing with the
debtor's crisis ought to be played out against an informed view of bankruptcy
law and its relationship to a theory of regulation.
This article discusses the relationship between bankruptcy and regulated
industries. One important aspect of that relationship stems from the
distinctive nature of each of the two fields. Administrative agencies and
bankruptcy courts would not have arisen unless specialized knowledge was
believed desirable. But expertise begets isolation. Knowledge of these
exclusive fields is not fully disseminated to the general bar and the public. In
the best of times this is a regrettable necessity. In times of financial stress, the
dual isolation hinders full analysis of available alternatives.
Part II of this article examines misconceptions concerning the effect of
bankruptcy on regulated entities. For example, many regard *a utility
bankruptcy as unthinkable and a potential disaster. 12 This view has it
backwards. The bankruptcy of a monopolistic utility is among the more
thinkable bankruptcies. The questionable nature of past analyses of utility
bankruptcy illustrates the need to incorporate bankruptcy considerations
more fully into the mainstream of economic life.
Part III turns from debunking myths about bankruptcy to investigating
whether bankruptcy might make a positive contribution in the utility area. For
the utility that is denied rate increases and is on the brink of financial collapse,
bankruptcy has its usual benefits-providing breathing space and preserving
going concern value. But bankruptcy may offer more advantages by
furthering regulatory goals. Detecting the additional benefits requires
settling on a basis for regulating utilities. The principal focus of Part III is on
3
the concept of representation, a central theme of the administrative state.'
Bankruptcy offers a framework in which to address several representational
imperfections. This part also assesses bankruptcy's possible enhancement of
representation in light of modern economic rationales for regulation.
After surveying myths about utility bankruptcy and assessing bankruptcy's
effect on representation of regulated industries, Part IV probes expected
problems in a utility bankruptcy. These problems are largely matters of
uncertainty, coordination, and delay. In bankruptcy, for example, enhanced
representation is viewed as competing with speed. Allowing broad or even
altered participation may slow the proceedings, a result regarded as
10. See, e.g., Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The ChiefJustice,
Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1985).
11. Bankruptcy itself could be regarded as a form of regulation and there are
proposals to have the bankruptcy system run by an administrative agency. See
accompanying notes 110-11.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 24-25.
13. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
(1975).
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undesirable. Part IV discusses questions of uncertainty and coordination and
then inquires whether speed is as important as it is usually believed to be in
bankruptcy reorganizations. The occasional benefits of delay will also be
suggested.
The observations on isolating expertise, altered representation, and
bankruptcy-regulatory coordination are of general applicability to many
debtor industries. It is not feasible to discuss the relationships of these issues
to all possible interactions between bankruptcy and regulation. Therefore,
this article is limited to some examples of such interaction. It emphasizes
bankruptcy's possible role for the electric utility industry because a nontrivial
portion of that industry is or has been near bankruptcy and because the
industry's possible fate in bankruptcy has become a matter of public debate.
Given this emphasis on the electric utility industry, it is useful to
supplement pure bankruptcy-administrative law considerations with an
exploration of the relationship between bankruptcy and the circumstances
underlying the current nuclear power plant crisis. In particular, bankruptcy's
role is shaped by regulators' views of how the current losses of the electric
utility industry should be allocated between ratepayers and investors. Part V
explores these matters and suggests that utility bankruptcies will not occur
unless regulatory authorities more fully understand bankruptcy and thereby
become less fearful of it. Yet, utility regulators often state the need to avoid
bankruptcy as a reason for granting rate increases, 14 a line of reasoning that
extends beyond the nuclear industry.' 5 Perceptions about bankruptcy will
shape the rate struggles that attend technological developments in the
regulatory future as well as those rate struggles that attend the fading away of
industries once so central that they commanded regulation in the public
interest.
An independent reason supports emphasizing the interaction between
bankruptcy and electric utilities. Many regard regulation as most warranted in
the industries that cannot efficiently support more than one firm, such as
14. In re Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 659, 678 (Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
Ind. 1986) (delays, costs, added layer of bankruptcy regulation, and uncertainties inherent in the
bankruptcy of an electric utility support raising rates to avoid bankruptcy); In re Maine Pub. Serv. Co.,
67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101-19 (Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n 1985) (costs of bankruptcy too
large); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349, 426 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1985) ("a denial of the proposed financing which results in a PSCNH bankruptcy would be
inconsistent with the public good"); In re Consumers Power Co., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 20
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1985); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 63 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 165,
186 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1984) (asking, in the future, for more thorough exploration of
bankruptcy alternative); In re Nantahala Power and Light Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 324, 336
(N.C. Util. Comm'n 1983) ("the roll-in methodology proposed [of applicant] ... by the intervenors
... will ultimately result in insolvency or bankruptcy ..
and an inability ... to meet ... customers'
needs for electric power ... ").
15. In re Investigation into Effects of Competition Upon Local and Toll Exch. Serv., 54 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 175 (Calif. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1983) (officers of companies predicting bankruptcy if
certain policies implemented); In re HVL Utilities, Inc., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 508, 515 n.5
(Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983) (mentioning, in passing, possible bankruptcy of water utility); In re
Gas Co. of Vt., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 460 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1982) (mentioning possibility of
bankruptcy of bottled gas company).
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some aspects of furnishing electricity.' 6 Under traditional views, these areas
7
of natural monopoly present the strongest case for economic regulation.'
Studying their relationship to bankruptcy law presents the purest case of
interaction. Therefore, there is little concern about accounting for effects
caused by a mistaken decision to regulate such areas, as seems to be the new
conventional view about regulating much of the transportation industry.' 8
One important caveat is in order. Even for insolvent entities, bankruptcy
is not usually the forum of choice in which to address financial difficulties.
Bankruptcy has real costs, and all parties must concede some measure of
control to the bankruptcy court. Whether regulated or not, most debtors and
their creditors would and should prefer to work out their problems in a
nonbankruptcy setting. Given this preference, bankruptcy rules are often
more important outside bankruptcy than in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Bankruptcy law, like other law, plays an important role whether or not it is
formally applicable. During negotiations outside bankruptcy, perceptions
about bankruptcy substantially influence the parties' positions and bargaining
strengths.' 9
For example, the utility management or investment banker that convinces
a public utility commission that bankruptcy would be disastrous has gone a
long way toward obtaining a rate increase. No public authority wants to have
a disaster on its regulatory conscience. If the disaster forecast is inaccurate,
the commission may grant a rate increase that it would otherwise deny or
reduce, thereby allocating a loss to ratepayers instead of investors. A
mistaken view of bankruptcy's effect on the amount of the debtor's worth
available to all parties may distort a regulatory body's view on the allocational
question of who should bear a loss. The shadow of bankruptcy thus reaches
well beyond proceedings in which bankruptcy law formally governs. Even if
16. It may be necessary to distinguish between electricity production, which may no longer be
viewed as a natural monopoly, and electricity transmission, which is still so regarded. See infra note
17.
17. S. BREYER, supra note 1, at 16; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 522-25 (12th ed.
1985); Dowd & Burton, DeregulationIs Not an Answer for Electric Utilities, 110 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 21, Sept.
16, 1982; Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976); Stewart, supra
note 13; Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. ECON.
233 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Williamson I]; Williamson, Franchise Biddingfor NaturalMonopolies-In
General and with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELLJ. ECON. 73 (1976). But see P. JosKow & R. SCHMALENSEE,
DEREGULATION OF ELECTRIC POWER:

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

(1982);

Berry, The Case for

Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 110 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 13, Sept. 16, 1982; Golub & Hyman, The
FinancialDifficulties and Consequences of Deregulation Through Divestiture, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 19, Feb. 17,
1983; Loeb & Magat, A DecentralizedMethod for Utility Regulation, 22 J.L. EcON. 399 (1979); Sharkey, A
Decentralized Methodfor Utility Regulation: A Comment, 22 J.L. ECON. 405 (1979); Meyer, A Modest Proposal
for the PartialDeregulation of Electric Utilities, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 23, April 14, 1983; Plummer, A

Different Approach to Electricity Deregulation, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 16, July 7, 1983.
18.

S. BREYER, supra note 1, at 197-239 (airlines and trucking); P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS,

supra note 17, at 526-27 (airlines and oil industry); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1689-90 (transportation
sector); Williamson I, supra note 17, at 258 (trucking).
19.

See Eisenberg, The UndersecuredCreditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L.

REV. 931, 965-66 (1985) (effect of § 1111 (b) on negotiations); cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (impact of divorce rules and

procedure on out-of-court bargaining).
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no major utility files for a chapter 11 reorganization, bankruptcy rules will
play an important role in determining the outcome of the current struggles
over the costs of today's nuclear power plants and in justifying proposed
20
future large rate increases.
II
BANKRUPTCY, REGULATED INDUSTRIES, AND CONFIDENCE

A

dual

problem

of isolation

attends

most

bankruptcy-regulatory

interaction. Bankruptcy and any particular regulatory scheme are each
isolated from the rest of the legal world. When two remote areas require
coordination, surprising results can occur. For example, the deregulation of
the economic aspects of airline transportation 2 l left no justification for the
special treatment in bankruptcy law of security interests in aircraft. If airlines
need not have their rates regulated, the case for special treatment of their
secured investors also disappears. Yet, Congress failed to repeal the
22
favorable treatment in bankruptcy of security interests in aircraft.
Some people caught up in the current electric utility crisis know little
about the bankruptcy alternative.2 3 Those knowledgeable about bankruptcy
know little about the electric utility industry. Bankruptcy for an electric utility
20. There is a "split-the-loss" atmosphere in several recent rate decisions. See Bussey, Consumers
Sets Big Write-Off on Midland, Wall St.J., Dec. 10, 1985, at 10, col. 1 (referring to grant of $94 million
rate increase out of $205 million emergency rate increase request); Richards, Spending Limit Asked on
Illinois Power Project, Wall St. J., July 30, 1985, at 3, col. 4 (recommending $2.69 billion spending
ceiling on Clinton plant with additional costs to be absorbed by shareholders); Richards, Utilities Seek
to Shirt State Rulings, Wall St.J., June 17, 1985, at 8, col. 2; Russell, Two Ohio Utilities to Take Charges
Related to Zimmer, Wall St.J., Dec. 20, 1985, at 8, col. 3 (disallowance of $861 million from customer
rates out of plant costs of $1.7 billion); Kansas City P&L, Kansas Gas Appeals in Rate Case Rejected, Wall
St.J., Nov. 14, 1985, at 43, col. 2; Lilco Can't Charge Users For a Third of Shoreham, Wall St. J.,June 27,
1985, at 6, col. 1; Limit to Funding of Seabrook Unit is Upheld by Court, Wall St.J., Sept. 13, 1985, at 16,
col. 4; Fitchburg G&E Says It Agreed to Absorb Some Seabrook Costs, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1985, at 11, col. 2;
PhiladelphiaElectric Accepts State Terms on Plant Completion, Wall St.J., Dec. 24, 1985, at 18, col. 2 (utility
accepts cap on amount of Limerick Unit No. 2 costs that will be absorbed by ratepayers); Pacific G&E
Receives Interim Rate Increase Totaling $53.8 Million, Wall St.J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 18, col. 4 (Pacific Gas
& Elec. receives about 26%, or $53.8 million, of a rate increase requested for costs of the Diablo
Canyon nuclear power plant); Wall St. J.,Jan. 9, 1986, at 26, col. 3 (unit of Middle South Utilities Inc.
accepts settlement under which it will receive partial rate increase to pay for its share of Grand Gulf
nuclear plant). Perhaps this is as it should be. See infra text accompanying notes 201-02; cf Stutz,
Risk Sharing in a Regulated Industry, 117 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 29, 32, April 3, 1986 ("Recent Department of
Energy studies, as well as a survey of plant cancellation ... show that risk sharing, often without any
claim of imprudence, has been the norm recently."). But see Paul, Electricity PricingPolicy That Switches
Risks to Investors Planned in California, Wall. St. J., Oct. 11, 1985, at 49, col. 1; Northern Indiana PS Will
Seek Rehearing on Rate-Rise Request, Wall St.J., Nov. 21, 1985, at 26, col. 3 (court ruling could preclude
utility from recovering any of its $2.8 billion investment in cancelled Marble Hill nuclear plant).
21. See, e.g., PROPHETS OF REGULATION, supra note 1, at 222-99 (discussing Alfred Kahn and the
deregulation of airline transportation).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1982).
23. "We think it's in the ratepayer's and state's best interest not to allow [the utility] to go into
bankruptcy ....
We don't have a very scientific basis for the decision." Winslow, Utility Chapter 11
Filing May Mean Problems for Consumers, Investors, Wall St. J., April 17, 1984, at 37, col. 3 (quoting
Indiana official).
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is said by some to be unthinkable, 24 and it is regarded by others merely as a
25
negotiating ploy.
This part first discusses the reasons for keeping some regulated industries
beyond the reach of bankruptcy law. The discussion provides a background
against which to assess the reasons offered for keeping regulated utilities out
of bankruptcy. The usual bankruptcy concerns about consumer confidence,
investor confidence, and related matters need to be rethought in the case of a
monopolistic utility.
A.

The Treatment of Regulated Industries in Bankruptcy

For purposes of this article, "regulated industries" refers to industries in
which basic industry functions are subject to detailed governmental regulation
and for which specialized regulatory bodies exist. The term thus embraces
much of the financial and utilities industries and excludes manufacturing
enterprises that may be subject to other forms of regulation, such as
automobile manufacturing. Industries with their own regulatory bodies raise
special questions because a governmental entity has been charged with
important aspects of management or control of the industry. That entity's
role in bankruptcy is likely to be especially interesting and important.
In these industries, such as transportation, electricity, gas, and water
utilities, regulation is intertwined with the business itself. Rates, plant
construction, service expansion or contraction, mailings to consumers, rates
of return, and other aspects of the business may be subject to administrative
regulation. The business cannot be viewed independently from the
regulatory structure to which it is subject. If one of these entities initiates a
bankruptcy proceeding, the proceeding will have to take account of the
special regulatory structure applicable to the debtor.
Bankruptcy law deals with these regulation-dominated industries through
a mixture of express exclusion from coverage by bankruptcy law, of highly
specific interaction, and of nearly complete silence. Financial institutions
illustrate the express exclusion theme. The railroads illustrate specific
interaction. Other utilities illustrate the theme of silence.
1. Industries Unsuitedfor Regular Bankruptcy. The bankruptcy system relies
on federal and state regulators to detect and heal those financial institutions
in fiscal ill health. Historically, bankruptcy law seems to have deferred to
some regulatory schemes because those schemes were in place before an
24. Public Serv. Co. of Oklahoma, Cause No. 27068, Order No. 206560, at 58 (Okla. Corp.
Comm'n, Jan. 15, 1982) ("Bankruptcy is not a viable option."); Hayes, Bankruptcy is Too DangerousFor Everyone, ELEC. WORLD, June 1984, at 3.
25. Generators of Bankruptcy: Some Utilities Are Approaching the Brink, TiME, July 23, 1984, at 81

(quoting Michael Totten, Director of the Critical Mass Energy Project). Some of the adverse reaction
to utility bankruptcy stems from the association of bankruptcy with termination of the debtor's
business. No one proposes utility bankruptcies in which service to customers simply ends. Threats
of bankruptcy and termination of service therefore may appropriately be branded a negotiating ploy.
See infra note 48.
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extensive federal bankruptcy law was available to corporations. 26 For
27
whatever historical reasons, federal regulators bail out Continental Illinois,
and most troubled banks are merged out of existence. Such institutions are
not even allowed to become the subject of traditional bankruptcy
proceedings.28
In an era when prior state regulation of financial institutions can hardly
continue to explain federal inaction, there is little pressure to have bankruptcy
law embrace these institutions. Three reasons support their continued special
treatment. The first is the common association of bankruptcy with liquidation
of the financially troubled entity. 29 The economic system regards unregulated
liquidation of a financial institution with alarm. Visions of depression era
"runs on the banks" have not vanished. Fear of extreme reactions underlies
reluctance to allow the straightforward liquidation of a bank or savings and
loan association.
The second and related reason pertains to user confidence. In the banking
system, the cost of loss of confidence is high. Allowing a bank to commence a
traditional chapter 11 bankruptcy runs the risk of a long period of uncertainty,
during which low user confidence may erode even further. The
announcement of a bankruptcy may ensure the failure of a financial
institution's rehabilitation effort.3 0 In addition, commencement of chapter 11
proceedings runs the risk of failure. Most reorganization proceedings wind
up as liquidations. This scenario is not acceptable for reasons of economic
and banking policy having little to do with bankruptcy.
The third reason for excluding financial institutions from bankruptcy is
that our system has a substantial investment in the notion that financial
institutions require expert regulation. The more necessary such regulation,
the less useful a routine bankruptcy proceeding is likely to be. If special
expertise is needed to assist troubled financial institutions, the bankruptcy
court, the traditional bankruptcy forum, may be at a relative disadvantage vis3l
a-vis federal or state regulatory authorities.

26. Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The Excluded Corporations,42 MINN. L. REV. 171 (1957).
Professor (now President) Sovern cogently suggests that there may be a greater need for federal
bankruptcy proceedings being open to insurance companies than there is for such proceedings being
open to banks. Id. at 207-31.
27. See The Nationalizationof Continental Illinois, FORTUNE, Aug. 20, 1984, at 135.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
29. Congress's early vision of bankruptcy as primarily a liquidation device undoubtedly
influenced early exclusion of banking and insurance corporations from bankruptcy coverage.
Sovern, supra note 26, at 207-08.
30. Even in a less regulated environment, loss of consumer confidence is cited as a prime reason
for avoiding bankruptcy or even talk of bankruptcy. See R. REICH & J. DONAHUE, NEw DEALS: THE
CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 106, 120-21 (1985).

31. Other businesses technically qualify for treatment under chapter 7 or chapter 11 but have
characteristics, such as a high need for consumer confidence, political leverage, or simple size, that
deflect treatment of them as traditional bankrupts. Chrysler underwent one of the most substantial
corporate reorganizations in economic history, but it did so outside the auspices of the bankruptcy
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2. Industries Treated Specially in Bankruptcy. Unlike financial institutions,
railroads, at least in the short term, are not so dependent on consumer
confidence. A railroad may be placed in chapter 11 without fear of
immediately losing customers. There will not be a "run to the buses."
Several railroads have operated under the protection of bankruptcy laws for
many years. Historically, the problem with railroads has been whether to
allow owners to close them down.
Because the consequences of reorganizing a railroad are regarded as less
cataclysmic than those of reorganizing a financial institution, bankruptcy law
does not prevent railroads from using chapter 11 and even provides a
subchapter dedicated to railroad reorganization. 32 Unlike regular chapter 11
proceedings, however, railroad reorganization cases require appointment of a
trustee who must be one of five disinterested persons whose names have been
33
submitted to the bankruptcy court by the Secretary of Transportation.
Railroad unions receive express protection against rejection of collective
bargaining

agreements, 3 4

protection

not

afforded

to

other

unions. 3 5

Furthermore, the automatic stay in bankruptcy law and the trustee's right to
use property of the bankruptcy estate do not affect secured loans to
36
railroads.
Perhaps most important, the Bankruptcy Code specifies the effect of the

Interstate Commerce Act and other railroad regulation on bankruptcy
proceedings. Under section 1166 of the Code, 3 7 the trustee is generally
subject to orders of any federal, state, or local regulatory body to the same
extent the debtor would be subject to such orders outside bankruptcy. 38 In
addition, the reorganization plan may provide for transfer or abandonment of
39
some of the debtor's railroad lines.
law. R. REICH & J. DONAHUE, supra note 30.

Had it ever filed for bankruptcy, some believe
liquidation would have been inevitable. See supra note 30.
For a company like Chrysler, consumer confidence is an important factor, one that might
evaporate almost overnight given the publicity that would accompany a bankruptcy filing. See
Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39J. FIN. 1067, 1071-72 (1984)

(reporting loss of confidence in companies in or near bankruptcy). A company that deals less with
the public, such as Manville, might be expected to survive more readily despite the adverse publicity
of a bankruptcy filing.
32. The special railroad bankruptcy statute dates from 1933. 47 Stat. 1474. See also 62 Stat. 163
(1948) (amendments to Interstate Commerce Act). The modern provision is codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1161-1174 (1982).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1163 (1982).
34. Id. § 1167.
35. Id. § 365.
36. Id. § 1168. The Code grants the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of
Transportation, and state regulators the right to be heard. Id. § 1164. The bankruptcy court is
required to consider the public interest. Id. § 1165. The Code specifies the effect of rejection of a
lease of a railroad line, id. § 1169, and the conditions for abandonment of a railroad line, id. § 1170.
Claims based on personal injury or death arising out of operation of the railroad are given priority
status. Id. § 1171.
37. Id. § 1166.
38. Exceptions to this rule apply in the case of proposed abandonment of a railroad, alterations
of financial structure, and issuance or sale of securities; and regulatory orders requiring the
expenditure of funds must be approved by the court. Id. § 1166.
39. Id. § 1172.
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3. The Rest of the Regulated Industries. Putting aside the special cases of
financial institutions and railroads, bankruptcy law provides little guidance on
how to conduct a reorganization in other industries affected by rate hearings
and similar administrative requirements. The Bankruptcy Code does not
completely displace federal and state regulatory authority with the regulatory
judgment of bankruptcy judges. Section 1 129(a)(6) of the Code conditions
bankruptcy court approval of a reorganization plan on satisfaction of the
following condition:
Any governmental regulatory commission with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the
plan, over the rates of the debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the
plan, or such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval.4"

Section 362(b) of the Code states that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does
not operate as a stay "of the commencement or continuation of an action or
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police
or regulatory power .... 4 The Judicial Code further requires a trustee,
receiver, or manager to manage and operate property in accordance with the
42
law of the state where the property is located.
This is all scant guidance as to how regulated industries should be treated
in bankruptcy. The provision excepting regulatory authorities from the
automatic stay on actions against the debtor 43 is a slender foundation on
which to construct a legal relationship between bankruptcy and regulation.
On its face, the provision merely suspends the automatic stay. Nothing is said
about who the first or primary actor should be when the bankruptcy court is
considering a plan. At most, the provision indicates that regulatory
authorities may proceed without seeking permission from the bankruptcy
court if they wish to do so. It does not indicate what role the results of the
state regulatory proceedings will have in the bankruptcy proceedings. The
Judicial Code's general instruction that trustees and others obey the law 44 is
too general a prescription to warrant the assumption that Congress meant the
provision to furnish guidance for the situations under discussion.
The plan confirmation provision also falls short of articulating a
relationship between the bankruptcy court and regulatory authority. Indeed,
the provision seems to leave to the bankruptcy court's discretion whether to
40.
41.

Id. § 1129(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
Id. § 362(b)(4).

42. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
43. The relationship between the automatic stay and regulatory authority has been the subject
of substantial litigation. See, e.g., In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1983); In
re Continental Airlines, 40 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1984); In re La Porta, 26 Bankr. 687 (Bankr.

N.D. Il1. 1982).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982). Interestingly, a few regulatory authorities have dealt with
financially troubled utilities partly by conditioning aspects of rate awards on the nonfiling of a
bankruptcy petition. In re Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101 (Maine Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1985); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 63 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 165 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1984). If such conditions were imposed by contract or by state statute, they would likely be
unenforceable under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b), (e), (f, 541, 545 (1982).
Congress's failure to expressly undermine such conditional rate awards probably should be viewed as
part of the larger statutory void in the area of bankruptcy-regulated industry relations.
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condition plan approval upon subsequent regulatory approval or to require
that regulatory approval be obtained prior to bankruptcy court approval.
Those who claim federal bankruptcy statutes mandate regulatory
dominance 4 5 also must take account of section 105. Section 105 authorizes a
bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 46 This section
provides as much prima facie statutory support for bankruptcy court
dominance as do other provisions for regulatory dominance. This is not a
47
matter upon which federal statutes make a firm pronouncement.
B.

The Roles of Consumer and Investor Confidence in the Case of
Monopolistic Utilities

The need for consumer confidence helps explain the exclusion of financial
institutions and other entities from traditional bankruptcy. This factor is less
significant in the case of monopolistic regulated utilities. Such utilities have a
source of funds and a set of dependent customers that will not disappear
quickly. Erosion of consumer confidence during reorganization does not
threaten the existence of a utility the way it threatens the existence of a
financial institution. There is no equivalent to a run on the bank when an
electric company incurs financial difficulty. The prospect of a failed
45. The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982), should also be noted. It limits federal court
authority to interfere with a state order affecting utility rates, but it has broad enough exceptions to
render it inapplicable in any likely bankruptcy proceeding.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
47. Despite the sparse statutory guidance, some debating the utility bankruptcy issue have
staked out both extreme positions. Arthur Young, echoed by Morgan Stanley, states that "[in cases
of conflict between authority of the bankruptcy court and the authority of a regulatory agency, the
court's authority is paramount." ARTHUR YOUNG & COMPANY, REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL

EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY, October 1980, at 11-33 [hereinafter cited as ARTHUR YOUNG & Co.]; A.
RODGERS RATLIFFE & P. TOMASETTI, THE EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON

THREE INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES, May 1984, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Morgan Stanley Report].
And bankruptcy courts have enjoined regulatory agencies where the courts found that agency action
threatened the debtor. In re National Hosp. and Institutional Builders, 658 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1149 (1982) (bankruptcy court may enjoin regulatory board from revoking
debtor's certificate of occupancy if proposed action was in bad faith); In re Otis & Co., 104 F. Supp.
201 (D. Ohio 1952) (enjoining administrative actions against debtor pending before the SEC); In re
Portland Electric Power Co., 97 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1943) (court temporarily restrained state
utility regulatory body from entering an emergency order granting a rate reduction); In re King
Memorial Hosp., 4 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (restraining state agency from forfeiting
debtor's "exemption from a certificate of need review" with respect to construction of new hospital).
Others suggest that the bankruptcy court would not or could not interfere with ratemakers'
authority. ELEC. UTIL.WEEK,June 11, 1984, at 11 (quotingJacob Worenklein) (available on NEXIS);
Stewart, A Bankrupt Electric Utility--What If?, 112 PUB. UTIL FORT. 15, 17, Sept. 15, 1983 (quoting
Aaron Levy of the SEC). See also Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939) (bankruptcy trustee
required to seek local regulatory approval before discontinuing unprofitable transportation services);
Jordan v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 716 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1983) ("bankruptcy judge has no power to
control [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's] interpretation and application of its own rules
and practices"); In re Gary Aircraft, 698 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1983) (bankruptcy court should defer to
agency with respect to liquidation of claims arising from a government contract dispute); In re
Larocque, 47 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (deferring to Agricultural Stabilization Conservation
Service County Committee where prior agency determination found to be fair); authorities discussed
in Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 145-46.
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reorganization does not haunt a utility bankruptcy. 48 So long as ratepayers
pay their bills and use the utility's product, prospects for ultimate failure are
49
small.
Two aspects of investor confidence are worth separating. The first
pertains to investor confidence in the troubled utility and the returns that
investors will demand if they are to lend to that utility shortly after
bankruptcy. Low investor confidence may lead to a demand for an unusually
high return on investment, thereby causing increased costs for the utility's
next construction project. The other aspect pertains to the future cost of
funds to the industry as a whole and, in the long term, to the bankrupt utility
and to society. A bankruptcy may affect future institutional arrangements for
utility financing.
The response to both concerns depends in part on actions that are taken
by the bankruptcy court and the regulatory authority. As will be discussed
below, if prepetition investments are scaled down in bankruptcy, the financing
costs of the troubled utility should decrease after bankruptcy. 50 But future
investors would then know that their package of risks includes the
circumstances triggering the bankruptcy. To the extent that the risk is
perceived as one that exists throughout the utility community, the costs of
51
future capital to the industry (and rates to customers) may increase.
If the bankruptcy court and regulatory authority fully honor prepetition
investments, however, the package of risks should not be viewed as
increasing, and costs of capital to the industry would be largely unaffected.
But the favorable treatment of prepetition investments would make it riskier
to lend to the utility after bankruptcy. As a result, the immediate financing
costs of the particular utility would not decrease.
Thus, the effect of bankruptcy on future access to capital depends, not
surprisingly, on how existing investments are treated in the bankruptcy
proceeding. It seems obvious that the effect is uncertain. Yet, most industry
reports on utility bankruptcy, though appropriately hedged, emphasize only
the "worst case" bankruptcy scenarios. The reports deemphasize the options
52
available to bankruptcy courts and to utilities for reducing financing costs.
48. This has not stopped the electric utility industry from trying to exploit the fear of turning
out the lights. Consider the following:
In an unlikely display of heavy-handedness, the court could begin to order the liquidation of
major utility assets so creditors can be paid ....
...
No one is sure if a state can require a utility not to interrupt its service despite liquidation
actions taken by the bankruptcy court.
ELEC. UTILITY WEEK, June 11, 1984 (remarks of Jacob Worenklein) (available on NEXIS).
49. Although a majority of consumers in a utility's service area will, for a while, regard
themselves as locked in, consumers of utility services will ultimately be sensitive to large rate
increases. To the extent people leave or decline to move to a utility's service area, one effect of
massively increased rates will be to reduce the utility's rate base, thereby requiring even further rate
increases. See generally A. LovINS, SoFr ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 30-31 (1977).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 59-68.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 186, 195-203.
52. One report notes that a bankruptcy petition would be accompanied by an emergency
request for higher rates from the state, thus raising the specter of bankruptcy leading to an
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These options are discussed here. The possible industry-wide and long-range
economic effects are addressed in Part V in the context of discussing the
53
allocation of losses between investors and ratepayers.
An Arthur Young & Company report on the Jersey Central Power & Light
Company, principal owner of Three Mile Island, identifies frequently cited
financing-related costs of a utility bankruptcy. 54 One important cost
identified is the increased cost of funds to the bankrupt utility. 5 5 The other
factors noted in the report and frequently relied upon are (1) the loss of low
embedded cost of fixed income securities on recapitalization, and (2)
increased risk premium on newly issued common stock. 5 6 These themes are
repeated in a report by Morgan Stanley covering Consumers Power, a
Michigan utility, the Long Island Lighting Company, and the Public Service
Company of New Hampshire (PSCNH). 57 A report prepared for the State of
New Hampshire on PSCNH states that "[it is anticipated that a Debtor-inPossession would have limited access to capital markets and then only at
terms unfavorable to the Debtor, its current creditors and ratepayers." 5 8
1. Future Borrowing Costs for Troubled Utility. Financing in bankruptcy is
more flexible and favorable to postpetition lenders than most reports to date
suggest. Under current bankruptcy law, routine borrowings by a troubled
utility probably would cost less after bankruptcy than they would cost the
same utility before bankruptcy. This is so despite the increased risk premium
usually associated with lending to an entity in bankruptcy. Indeed, the
postpetition cost of borrowing should be significantly smaller for an electric
utility. To defend these assertions, it is necessary to explore some details of
bankruptcy law in view of the nature of the entity under consideration.
Under section 364(a), a trustee or debtor-in-possession may obtain
unsecured credit and incur unsecured debt in the ordinary course of
business. 5 9 These obligations are administrative expenses of the bankruptcy
6 0 If
estate entitled to priority over prepetition claims against the debtor.
immediate increase in rates. ELEC. UTIL. WEEK, June 11, 1984 (remarks of Jacob Worenklein)
(available on NEXIS). A utility will file for bankruptcy, however, only if substantial rate increases
have been denied and if cost reduction measures fail.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 195-203.
54. ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., supra note 47, at 111-12.
55. The report phrases increased cost in terms of funds for future capital requirements, but the

point could be generalized to other borrowings by the bankrupt utility. Id.
56. Id. The report also notes the cost of litigation and other administrative aspects of the
bankruptcy process. Id. at 111-2.
57. Morgan Stanley Report, supra note 47, at 13.
58. Devine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch, The State of New Hampshire and Public Service Company
of New Hampshire, Sept. 18, 1984, at 22. See also Stewart, A Bankrupt Electric Public Utility-What If?,
54 OKLA. BARJ. 1131, 1133 (1983).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1982).
60. Id. §§ 364(a), 503(b)(1). Itmay be a close question whether capital borrowing by a utility is
in the ordinary course of business and, therefore, subject to section 364(a). Ordinary course
borrowing may be reserved for borrowings to pay more current expenses. But the point need not
detain us. A bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession may seek long-term unsecured financing
under section 364(b) and again confer administrative priority on the lender's claim. Id § 364(b).
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necessary, a debtor-in-possession or trustee may issue secured debt, and that
debt can be given priority over preexisting secured claims. 6 '
Examined from the point of view of a potential lender, the possibility of
postpetition priority borrowing suggests that the cost of funds to the debtor
could decrease in bankruptcy. Consider a debtor with $100 million unsecured
debt, in need of an additional $100 million in capital. An unsecured lender
outside bankruptcy who lends the additional $100 million will share equal
priority with the prior lenders of $100 million. If there is less than $200
million to be distributed to creditors, the new lender (as well as the earlier
lenders) will not be repaid in full. Unless expressly subordinated, all
unsecured debt ranks equally under state law.
Consider the same situation in bankruptcy. There the postpetition lender
of the additional $100 million finds itself, under section 364, with priority
over the earlier $100 million. If there is less than $200 million but more than
$100 million to distribute, the postpetition lender will be paid in full and the
prepetition lender will not. Although other costs of the bankruptcy, such as
attorneys' fees, must be taken into account, these will reduce the amount
available to all lenders. Only if bankruptcy costs were enormously high would
the postpetition lender be worse off than if it were lending before bankruptcy.
The available evidence indicates that direct bankruptcy costs are not of such
62
magnitude.
In comparing prepetition and postpetition lending, the important
consideration is not the absolute cost of funds in bankruptcy, but rather their
cost relative to a similar loan to the same debtor outside bankruptcy. If there
will be a pool of assets sufficient to pay off administrative claims, the position
of a postpetition lender to a utility appears safer than the position of a
prepetition unsecured lender. It is misleading to state the issue in a way that
suggests that the fact of bankruptcy imposes an enormous added burden on
access to capital. For one could equally well ask whether a utility in financial
trouble that does not file for bankruptcy could raise capital at a nonexorbitant
cost. The PSCNH Seabrook experience, in which financing proposals
involved rates of return to investors in excess of twenty percent, suggests that
63
it could not.
61. Id. § 364(c), (d). The trustee or debtor-in-possession must provide prepetition secured
creditors with "adequate protection" of their interest before subordinating their liens on the
property to a postpetition lender and must not be able to obtain secured credit otherwise. Id.
§ 364(d)(1)(A), (B). For discussion of the controversy surrounding the concept of adequate
protection, see In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1986); In re American Mariner Inds.,
Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 432-35 (9th Cir. 1984).
For an illustration of a postpetition secured lender being granted a superpriority over all claims,
including administrative expenses, see In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
In such cases, there may be disputes over the authority to award interim fees to attorneys and others
at the possible expense of the priority lender. Compare Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., supra, with In re
Callister, 15 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981), aff'd, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 21 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 170-78.
63. See CAMPAIGN FOR RATEPAYERS' RIGHTS, REPORT TO DONORS AND FRIENDS, No. 7 (Dec. 1985)
(22% financing cost); Municipal Utilities with Seabrook Stake Plan Issue of Notes, Wall St.J., Oct. 14, 1985,
at 21, col. 1 (tax-exempt notes to yield about 16.4%). See also Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 138-
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Given these facts, why is greater use not made of bankruptcy to exploit
postpetition lending opportunities at the expense of prepetition financers?
For a debtor with a doubtful cash flow and financial future, the administrative
priority is not a panacea to postpetition unsecured lenders. There is no
assurance in the Bankruptcy Code that all administrative expenses will be
paid. There is little assurance that the business will survive. Most
reorganization efforts fail. A nontrivial risk premium makes sense.
For a debtor likely to survive, however, and one, like a utility, with
thousands of locked-in customers, immediate postpetition cash flow is
unlikely to be a serious problem. Unsecured administrative priority for shortterm debt is a safe lending position. The risk premium normally associated
with lending to bankrupt entities should not prevail.
Further comfort may be drawn from the usually limited scope of a utility's
problem. Today's troubled electric utilities are not yet entities that face
massively declining demand for their product. 64 Many of their troubles stem
from a single isolated matter such as a burdensome plant or investment.
Prospects for financial rehabilitation of such an entity are brighter than are
prospects for saving a business in general decline or a utility in a declining
65
industry. Thus, Penn Central's difficulty in attracting postpetition financing
does not provide guidance for utility bankruptcies. That bankruptcy involved
a declining industry subject to important new competition from trucking and
air transportation. 6 6 There was no single source of financial difficulty the
removal of which would have allowed a return to financial health.
39 (hypothesizing utility unable to obtain funds outside of bankruptcy). There is one wrinkle in this
analysis worth noting. A judicially developed "six months" rule treats as expenses of bankruptcy
administration, and thus entitled to administrative priority on a par with expenses treated under
section 364, the costs of labor, supplies, repairs, and some capital provided to a debtor within six
months before the appointment of a trustee. The rule was developed in railroad reorganizations, see
Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 339 (1878), and was extended to other public service corporations, see In re
Hallmark Medical Servs., Inc., 475 F.2d 801, reh'g denied, 478 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973); Dudley v.

Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945); Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Memphis Gaslight Co., 125
F. 97 (6th Cir. 1903). The rule provides unsecured creditors with additional motivation to risk
lending to a failing enterprise. It thus marginally decreases the differences between prepetition
lending and postpetition lending without eliminating those differences. The status of the six months
rule under the new Bankruptcy Code is not settled.
64. Electricity's share of U.S. energy consumption has almost doubled since 1960. Cavanagh,
supra note 4, at 301 (citing to ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW 1984, at 11 (1985)). Generation of electricity in the United States has showed a slow but
steady increase since 1970. D. CHAPMAN, ENERGY RESOURCES AND ENERGY CORPORATIONS 69 (1983)
(Figure 4-3). But see R. SANr, D. BAKKE & R. NAILL, CREATING ABUNDANCE: AMERICA'S LEAST-COST
ENERGY STRATEGY 134 (1984) ("centrally generated electricity at current prices is already
uncompetitive in several energy service markets . . . [and] is in many cases losing to conservation
technologies[,] . .. cogeneration, and other decentralized sources of electric generation").
65. "[W]ithin six months of Penn Central's bankruptcy petition it was apparent that no entity
would lend money to the debtor on any terms absent a sweeping federal guaranty of loan
obligations." Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 161 n.86, citing H.R. REP. No. 1770, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1970). Congress enacted legislation authorizing federal guarantees of priming loans made
to reorganizing railroads. Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-663, 84 Stat. 1975
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 661-68 (1982)). The matter is discussed in Perritt, Ask and Ye
Shall Receive: The Legislative Response to the Northeast Rail Crisis, 28 VILL. L. REV. 271 (1983).

66.

This is not to deny the existence of some competition affecting electric utilities. See R. SANr,

D. BAKKE & R. NAILL, supra note 64; Habicht, Competition Can Power Utilities Into the Black, Wall St. J.,
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In short, a rational lender may well charge a utility in bankruptcy less for
funds than it would charge the same utility outside bankruptcy. 67 In other
settings, even after the bankruptcy case is closed and the administrative
priority lost, many debtors are still able to borrow. 68 Whether this is true for
a particular debtor must depend on whether the financial community
perceives the causes of the bankruptcy to have been eradicated by the
proceeding. But a sound reorganization plan should make it easier rather
than more difficult for a financially troubled utility to gain reasonable access
to capital markets.
These considerations address the general concern of increased funding
costs to bankrupt utilities. They do not specifically address the concerns
about losing the benefits of low embedded cost debt and the premium needed
to attract future stockholders, tasks to which we now turn.
2. Costs of Attracting Equity Investment. Considerations similar to those
bearing on the cost of attracting new debt financing also apply to the cost of
attracting equity investment in a bankrupt utility. The precise position of the
new equity investor, however, depends more heavily on the reorganization
plan than did the lender's position. Again, it may be less costly to attract new
equity in bankruptcy than it would be outside bankruptcy.
Consider the debtor with $100 million in prepetition debt and prepetition
equity investors whose investment of $50 million is currently worth $10
million. Such a debtor will likely need to promise to pay dividends at a
substantial premium to attract additional equity outside bankruptcy. The new
investors, assuming they receive stock of equal rank with the prior investors,
will find their equity investment immediately diluted by the full weight of the
prior shareholders' interests and will rank behind the preexisting debt
interests. Information about troubled utilities supports the notion that a
69
dividend premium is necessary under such circumstances.
In bankruptcy, however, the prior debt can be scaled down to help attract
new equity, and the old equity must be scaled down to its actual value of $10
million. A new equity investor need not worry about the diluting effect of
prior equity. On initial examination the cost of new equity might also be
expected to decrease in bankruptcy. Like a postpetition lender, a postpetition
Oct. 14, 1985, at 14, col. 3; Paul, Easing of Electric Rate Increases Benefits Industry and Consumers, Wall St.
J., Sept. 12, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (noting competition from oil and natural gas); Richards, Cogenerated
Power Irritates Utilities, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1985, at 6, col. 1; Richards, Power Users Seek Relief from
Nuclear Costs, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (shift in utility used by town after 32% rate
increase); Sawhill, Your Local Utility Will Never Be the Same, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at 14, col. 3
(competition driving the restructuring of electric utility industry).
67. See also Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON.,
May 1977, 239, 260-62 (in study of railroad bankruptcies, investors purchasing a portfolio of bonds
on the date of bankruptcy appear to earn abnormal returns).
68. Cf D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 62-64 (1971) (only
one-third of consumer debtors found credit harder to obtain after bankruptcy).
69. Examine, for example, the stock market report in a recent issue of the Wall StreetJournal.
Find those utilities that are paying the highest dividends and you will have constructed a list of
utilities in serious financial difficulty.
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equity investor may regard the utility in bankruptcy as a safer investment than
the troubled utility outside bankruptcy. If the reorganization plan actually
reduces the debtor's debt burden and if prepetition shareholders lose a
portion of their interest, as would be likely in any reorganization, the
postpetition equity investor should be better off when the financially troubled
utility is in bankruptcy than it would be investing at the same time in the same
70
company in a nonbankruptcy setting.
3. Loss of Low Embedded Fixed Costs. Some believe that bankruptcy would
cause loss of low embedded cost debt. 71 This seems to mean that, in any
recapitalization accompanying a reorganization, old debt issued at favorable
rates might be replaced with new debt issued at higher rates. The Oklahoma
Corporation Commission relied on loss of low embedded fixed costs in
72
bankruptcy as a reason for granting rate increases to help avoid bankruptcy.
The importance of this factor for any particular utility depends on that utility's
debt structure. For some utilities, current interest costs may be lower than
historical costs, in which case the loss of low embedded cost factor disappears.
But for others, it is a factor worthy of consideration.
Building on this theme, the Morgan Stanley Report observed that the
embedded cost of debt for Consumers Power in Michigan is 10.1%, for Lilco
10.4%, and for PSCNH 14.0%. These costs were all said to be "well below
current market rates for below investment grade securities." 73 Would the
benefits of these low rate borrowings be lost in bankruptcy?
To the extent the costs referred to are costs of past borrowing, the
argument that bankruptcy will adversely affect them is seriously
oversimplified.7 4 Those funds have already been borrowed. The question in
bankruptcy is as much one of whether they will be repaid at all as it is one of at
what interest rate they will be repaid. One way to deal with past borrowings in
bankruptcy is not to repay them. If the debts are not repaid, the loss of their
low interest rate becomes an insignificant detail.
Nevertheless, circumstances might dictate repayment of prepetition low
interest debts. If the value of the firm exceeds the amount of debt, then the
75
reorganization plan probably must provide for payment of the debt in full.
The fact that debt is to be repaid under the plan, however, does not mean it
70. The postpetition stock investor, however, does not automatically find itself in a position of
administrative priority. Such an investor must be concerned about ranking behind both portions of
prepetition debt that are not scaled down in bankruptcy and all postpetition debt.
71. ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., supra note 47, at 111-15.
72. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Cause No. 27068, Order No. 206560, at 57-58 (Okla. Corp.
Comm'n, Jan. 15, 1982).
73. Morgan Stanley Report, supra note 47, at 13.
74. Lenders locked in by a contract to lend to a utility at low rates in the future would be
relieved of that obligation in the event of bankruptcy. A trustee or debtor-in-possession may not
assume an executory contract to lend money. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1982). Of course, some lenders
may have seen fit to protect themselves with financial covenants that relieve them of the obligation to
make future advances (even to a nonbankrupt entity) in the event of the debtor's financial difficulty.
75. Id. § 1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). One would have to repay the debt in full if the
firm's value exceeded its outstanding liabilities. See id. § 1129(1). The Arthur Young Report
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will carry a higher interest rate. The debtor may leave low cost, prepetition
debt in place in accordance with its original terms. 76 In bankruptcy parlance,
this treatment does not "impair" the creditor's claim. A creditor with an
unimpaired claim is not even entitled to vote on the debtor's reorganization
plan. 7 7 Furthermore, debt may be deemed unimpaired notwithstanding a
prepetition default if the default is cured, the original maturity of the debt
instrument is reinstated, and the lender is compensated for damages resulting
from the default. 78 Analyses that project the loss of low embedded costs are
assuming that prepetition debts will be repaid in full under a plan that impairs
79
these debt interests.
Even if prepetition debts are repaid in full, bankruptcy may reduce the cost
of borrowed funds. This is possible because bankruptcy suspends the accrual
of interest as of the date of the filing of the petition.8 0 Any unsecured funds
borrowed before bankruptcy are, in effect, used by the bankrupt on an
interest-free basis during the pendency of the proceedings. Unsecured
lenders subject to the suspension of interest on prepetition loans are not

entitled to protection of their interest through interim payments. Since a
major utility reorganization is unlikely to be a brief affair, the effective cost of
prepetition funds to a debtor should be substantially reduced during the
proceedings. Indeed, this interest-free use of funds provides shareholders
with an incentive to prolong the proceedings in the hope that the stock will
increase in value.
III
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND REGULATORY THEORY

Dire projections about the effects of a utility bankruptcy are largely
unfounded. Once one discards initial fearful reactions, bankruptcy may
supply benefits other than the obvious benefit of avoiding piecemeal
dismantling of the debtor.8 ' Some problems faced by financially troubled
utilities are not purely matters of dollars and cents. There are also questions
of representation, participation, and regulatory theory. Bankruptcy may make
its most important contributions to a troubled utility in these areas. If
representation and participation are flawed and bankruptcy can help correct
assumes that the utility it studied has assets worth more than liabilities. ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., supra
note 47, at 111-3 to 111-10.
76. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (1982), a class of claims or interests is not impaired if a
reorganization plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim
or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest." Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984), a class that is not impaired under the plan within the meaning of section 1124 does
not even have to approve the plan.
77. Id. § 1129(a)(8)(B).
78. Id. § 1124(2)(A), (B), (C).
79. For one of the rare analyses from the investment or utility community that emphasizes some
of the most important benefits of bankruptcy, see Whitman, Virtues of Bankruptcy, BARRON'S, May 6,
1985, at 16.
80. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
81. In the utility area, piecemeal dismantling of the debtor can be avoided or at least deferred by
rate increases.
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the flaws, going concern value may be enhanced. But benefits are only part of
the story. This part and Part IV attempt to set forth both the benefits and
burdens of a utility bankruptcy. Improved representation may be the prime
benefit of bankruptcy and administrative costs may be its prime burden.
A.

The Role of Bankruptcy Law Under the Traditional Model of
Administrative Law

One tack for exploring the less obvious benefits of bankruptcy in the utility
area is to build upon the foundations of administrative law. Identifying what
regulatory schemes seek to accomplish permits a consideration of whether
bankruptcy law is likely to further those goals.
Under one view of administrative law, there would be little for the
bankruptcy process to contribute. In what Professor Stewart terms the
"traditional model," administrators' decisions are regarded as implementing
a plainly discernable legislative will.
The traditional model of administrative law . . . conceives of the agency as a mere
transmission belt for implementing legislative directives in particular cases. It
legitimates intrusions into private liberties by agency officials not subject to electoral
control by ensuring that 8such
intrusions are commanded by a legitimate source of
2
authority-the legislature.

Interference with legislatively supported administrative decisions could
subject the bankruptcy process to criticism on two counts. On the substantive
level, bankruptcy law would be tinkering with decisions of experts presumably
better qualified to deal with an area. On the process level, bankruptcy courts
would be changing the substance of legislatively mandated action without the
political accountability attributed to regulators.
Bankruptcy law's special treatment of railroads reflects both the traditional
model of administrative law-what could be more traditional than railroad
regulation?-and a predictable response to the problems perceived in
bankruptcy court interference with such a regulatory structure. A
nonbankruptcy statutory scheme for regulating railroads is supplemented in
bankruptcy by another specialized set of provisions for railroads.8 3 Under the
traditional model of administrative law, such provisions may be the only
acceptable response to the bankruptcy of a regulated entity. Specific
bankruptcy legislation covering railroads reduces the problem of inexpert
bankruptcy courts dealing with matters with respect to which the regulatory
agency is better qualified. Such legislation requires bankruptcy courts to
defer to the body charged with railroad regulation, the ICC. The bankruptcy
court's actions are endorsed by a detailed statutory scheme, thereby
maintaining perceived political accountability.

82.
83.

Stewart, supra note 13, at 1675.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
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The Role of Bankruptcy Law Under the Modern
Emphasis on Representation

The demise of the traditional model of administrative law is ably traced
elsewhere.8 4 The importance of its demise for the present inquiry is the
resulting need for another standard by which to assess the role of bankruptcy
in the administrative state. Without suggesting that it is the only possible
standard, one interesting candidate is the concept of representation.
Representation is both an important theme of modern administrative law and
an idea of growing importance in bankruptcy. Much of the modern concern
about agency decisions focuses on adequate representation of diverse
interests.8 5 The expansion of due process rights, standing, and rights of
participation before administrative agencies may all be viewed as efforts to
broaden representation.8 6 Whether such broadened representation is
normatively desirable, adequacy and breadth of representation have become
87
standards by which to evaluate the administrative process.
Even those critical of the modern emphasis on representation may find the
representational adjustments in bankruptcy law to be acceptable, for much of
the effect of bankruptcy law on representation goes not to the breadth of the
basis of representation of all possible interests, but rather to flaws in the
nonbankruptcy representational scheme.
On the bankruptcy side, questions concerning representation in the
bankruptcy process are emerging. For example, the problem of participation
by the SEC in the reorganization process was an issue debated before the
enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code, 88 and the question of representation
in bankruptcy of future tort claimants is a matter occupying several courts.8 9
Less in the headlines, but perhaps more fundamental to bankruptcy, is the
way the Code allocates representation to those with claims against the debtor.
Much of the complexity in the Code's confirmation standards stems from an
effort to allocate the right to vote on a proposed plan of reorganization. 90
In light of the representation's possible bearing on a debtor's problems,
several questions arise: Can bankruptcy improve upon the nonbankruptcy
representational structure? Is there reasonable hope that the bankruptcy
court can provide fuller, fairer, or in any way better representation of
interests? The next four subparts address these questions.
84. Stewart, supra note 13.
85. "Increasingly, the function of administrative law is not the protection of private autonomy
but the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of
affected interests in the process of administrative decision." Id. at 1670. See also Reich, Public
Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985).
86. Stewart, supra note 13, at 1711-60.
87. For criticisms of the interest group representation view of administrative law, see Reich,
supra note 85, at 1619-27; Stewart, supra note 13, at 1760-89.
88.

E.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 8.

89. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985).
90. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1126, 1129 (1982).
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1. Replacing Management. The bankruptcy court's first opportunity to
rearrange representation arises shortly after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The bankruptcy court may be asked to exercise its authority to
replace the debtor's management with a trustee. 91 It is common for a
reorganizing debtor's management to remain in place and for a trustee not to
be appointed to run the debtor's business. The costs, in terms of time and
continuity, of finding new competent management can be high.
Because of the high cost of replacement, corrupt managers are the prime
candidates for replacement by a bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy court's
authority to replace management is not limited to replacing thieves; it may
also replace inefficient managers. 9 2 In doing so, the court may shift the
interests represented by management in a way that is not likely to occur
outside the bankruptcy forum. If the source of financial difficulty can be
traced to a single position stubbornly adhered to by management, such a shift
may be all that is needed to begin the recovery of a troubled debtor.
Consider the case of a bankrupt electric utility with a management
determined to complete an uneconomical nuclear power plant. The plant
construction and debt service costs burden the utility. Failure to complete the
plant would reflect poorly on management, which has continually backed the
plant. It is politically impossible for existing management to reverse course.
Politicians in the state may also have become boxed in. In such a situation, a
bankruptcy court can break the management-generated political logjam
merely by replacing management.
The court should be confident that it has properly identified the source of
the utility's problem and its connection to current management. Reported
allegations of utility mismanagement are so numerous that serious
investigation is warranted. 93 Once it is determined that management is part
of the problem, the bankruptcy court would likely find it easier to displace
management than would shareholders outside bankruptcy. Shareholders are
not known for their revolts against management, and it might not be in the
91. Id. § 1104(a). The court may take the less drastic step of appointing an examiner to
investigate the debtor while management remains in place. Id. § 1104(b). Appointment of a trustee
or examiner must be on request of a party in interest. For a utility-flavored case indicating that
appointment of auditors, investigators, and examiners is within the equity power of the bankruptcy
court, see In re Utilities Power & Light, 90 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1937).
92. The statutory standard for replacing management is:
for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of
the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case ....
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (1982).
93. For findings of mismanagement (without replacement), see In re Wolf Creek Nuclear
Generating Facility, 70 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 475 (Kansas St. Corp. Comm'n 1985); Kansas City
Power Gets 33.41 Boost in Missouri Rates, Wall St.J., Apr. 24, 1986, at 22, col. 1 (rate request cut 58%
owing to inefficient or imprudent management).

For allegations of mismanagement, see Cook,

Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82; Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 150 n.49. See also ELEC.
UTIL. WEEK, May 28, 1984, at 7 ("street wisdom" holds that an impending bankruptcy is needed to
shock utility managers into operating more efficiently) (available on NEXIS); Letter from Peter A.
Bradford, Chairman, Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n, to Theodore Eisenberg, Apr. 3, 1986 (suggesting
that Central Maine Power Company's return to relative financial health may be connected to a clean
sweep of management by the Board of Directors).
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shareholders' interest to stage a coup. If a plant is abandoned before its costs
can be incorporated into a utility's rate base, much of the shareholders' equity
in a company is likely to be eliminated. Their best hope is for completion and
for the costs to be passed on to ratepayers. Bankruptcy gives a voice in
management to those otherwise without one or with one that can be exercised
only through a highly attenuated political process. 9 4 Even without replacing
management, a bankruptcy court can take the less drastic step of authorizing
an investigation by an examiner 9 5 who reports to the court on the
management and affairs of the debtor.
2. Scaling Down Prepetition Interests. Management is not the only group
with a position that can be modified in a bankruptcy proceeding. As pointed
out above, the interests of shareholders and creditors may be best served by
pursuing to completion an economically questionable project. Under state
law, shareholders and creditors may be required to bear the cost of an
uncompleted project, while completion of the project would allow costs to be
passed on to ratepayers. Outside bankruptcy, the shareholders' voice in the
enterprise is often tied to historical investment rather than to current values,
giving them relatively more influence than is warranted by the true current
value of their interest in the debtor.
To illustrate the point, consider a debtor on the brink of bankruptcy. Its
net worth is near zero or perhaps below zero, depending on whose valuation
is used. Outside bankruptcy, the shareholders continue to have full formal
control of the enterprise, control manifested through a management reluctant
to take positions that directly damage shareholder interests. Although
creditor interest in and influence on the debtor might be expected to be
growing, 96 formal decisionmaking control remains with the shareholders and
management. Yet the value of what shareholders own may well be zero. To
leave the shareholders in formal control at this point may be disastrous since
they may require the debtor to take extraordinary risks in the hope of
achieving a positive net worth and recovering their investment. The
shareholders have nothing to lose.
In bankruptcy, the court can scale down the representation of shareholder
interests to render their formal representational rights proportional to the
true economic value of their interests. Representation in bankruptcy, in the
form of voting rights to accept or reject a plan, is a function of the value of a
claimant's interest in the debtor, not a function of paper claims in debt or
stock against the debtor.
3. Regulators as an Interest Group. Outside bankruptcy, a regulatory
authority must be viewed as a neutral adjudicator. An agency may be subject
94. See generally Stewart, supra note 13, at 1790-1802.
95. A bankruptcy court must appoint an examiner upon request of a party in interest if the
debtor has debts in excess of $5 million. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2) (1982).
96. Creditor influence could formally increase if lenders' debt instruments included financial
covenants that increased creditor control in times of financial difficulty.
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to judicial review, but it is regarded as the formal embodiment of the public
interest. A regulatory authority that has approved all the steps that lead to the
brink of bankruptcy, however, is not necessarily a detached observer parceling
out representational rights among others. Such an authority may adopt an
advocate's role to justify past decisions. A bankruptcy court may consider that
the regulatory authority is itself an interest capable of advocate-like behavior.
The court can provide a check on this vital interest group. Outside
bankruptcy, such a check can be obtained only after substantial delay and
expense, subject to standards of judicial review of administrative action, and
97
on the basis of a record constructed by the agency itself.
4.

Broadening the Base of Representation. A bankruptcy court may broaden

representation in two ways. First, it can expand the number of groups given a

voice in proceedings affecting the debtor. In the asbestos bankruptcies, a
crucial question has become whether asbestos workers with future claims,
claims that would not be actionable under state law at the time of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, may or must be represented in the companies'
reorganization proceedings. 98 In a nonbankruptcy setting, there is no formal
mechanism through which to give such an inchoate interest a current voice.
The role of interested but underrepresented parties is likely to become an
important question in a utility bankruptcy. For example, ratepayers are the
prime source of funds for a regulated utility, and a utility in trouble will be
looking to rate increases to bail itself out. Outside bankruptcy, the ratepayers'
point of view 9 9 may be presented to the regulatory authority. But the case for
allowing only the authority to speak for the public diminishes once the
authority has approved actions leading to the bankruptcy. 0 0 The question
that arises is whether ratepayers are entitled to independent representation in
the bankruptcy proceedings.
In bankruptcy, however, ratepayers lack the formal status of creditor or

shareholder and are not likely to be viewed as holders of claims (debts) or
97. Bankruptcy courts will be in a position to provide a check only on ratemaking authorities
that provide rates too favorable to ratepayers. Authorities that render rate decisions too favorable to
investors will grant sufficient rate increases to keep a utility out of dire financial difficulty. Even
regulators wishing to grant increases may see a benefit to a bankruptcy proceeding. Regulators who
favor rate increases may feel political pressure not to follow their best regulatory judgment. If a
bankruptcy court is likely to grant the desired rate increase or is unlikely to prevent the regulatory
authority from granting an increase, the bankruptcy court may absorb some of the political heat that
would otherwise focus solely on the regulators.
98. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1037-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (appointment of a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of prospective unknown asbestos claimants).
99. I realize the difficulty in referring to a single ratepayer's point of view. Aside from the
regulatory authority, there is no obvious candidate to present the official "public interest" view with
respect to a rate increase request. This problem exists both inside and outside of bankruptcy and has
been addressed by many states by providing for public counsel or citizen utility boards, see, e.g., Mo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 386.700, .710 (Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-16 to 20 (1986); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4911.01-19 et seq. (1977); WIsC. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.01-.09 (Supp. 1986), or by
allowing recovery of fees, see 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (1985) (allowing compensation for costs of consumer
participation in proceedings affecting electric utilities where state does not provide a compensation
mechanism).
100. But see Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 140.
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interests (equity), the groups normally entitled to representation in
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code does provide for representation of a
"party in interest," a concept seemingly broader than that of claim or interest,
who may be heard on any issue in a bankruptcy case.' 0 ' Ratepayers of a
regulated utility are strong candidates for "party in interest" status. Much of
the debate in the utility industry focuses on how to allocate the cost of
burdensome facilities between investors and ratepayers. Ratepayers will be
involuntarily funding the plan, directly or indirectly, and should be granted a
fresh, formal voice in the proceedings.
The second way in which representation may be broadened in the
bankruptcy setting is by expanding the range of decisions with respect to
which nonmanagement interests are entitled to representation. For example,
the decision to construct or complete a power plant is not always within the
jurisdiction of the regulatory agency. 10 2 If excluded from agency
consideration, these decisions become, in practice, exclusively those of
management. Yet the decisions may substantially influence regulators. Once
presented with a completed plant, regulators may be tempted to allow it to be
brought on line and included in the rate base. In bankruptcy, such
construction or completion decisions can be reviewed by nonmanagement
interests even if the regulatory authority would lack jurisdiction. Such
decisions would have to be incorporated into a reorganization plan, where
they could be voted upon, and comments upon the decisions could be
solicited from all interested parties, including ratepayers.
C.

Bankruptcy and the New Economic Rationales for Regulation

Another approach to regulation also suggests that bankruptcy might
validly address representational defects. Economists draw on Professor Ian
Macneil's theory of relational contracts in addressing the theoretical
justification for regulation. Macneil argues that the world of contract is best
regarded not as "a world of discrete transactions" but rather as "a world of
relation, an ongoing dynamic state, no segment of which-past, present or
03
future-can sensibly be viewed independently from other segments."'
Whether this relational view, standing alone, captures all of Contract is not
101.

11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).

102. See Public Serv. Co. of Okla., Cause No. 27068, Order No. 206560, at 54 (Okla. Corp.
Comm'n,Jan. 15, 1982) ("We recognize that the decision to construct or to continue to construct an
electric generating station is a decision which under Oklahoma law rests exclusively with
management of our electric utilities"), quoted in Note, Public Utilities: The Black Fox Nuclear Project
CancellationDilemma: OfJudicial Review and Reform of Oklahoma's Administrative Process, 36 OKLA.L. REV.

190, 197 (1983). New Hampshire law appears only to require that a utility report the
commencement of construction of a plant to the regulatory authority. Permission to commence
construction from the authority does not appear to be necessary. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374:5
(1984).
103. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S.CAL. L. REV. 691, 694 (1974) (footnote omitted);
Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation,60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974). See also Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Professor

William Klein makes an analogous point but does so from the perspective of the firm rather than
from the perspective of the individual contract. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining
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important, for surely it captures much that is significant. Most successful
ventures do not triumph on the basis of a single isolated contract. Long-term
relationships are a foundation of commerce.
Building upon Macneil's work, Professor Oliver Williamson describes the
situations in which economic activity will be more efficiently organized if the
relational character of the contractual situation is acknowledged and endorses
a governance structure most suitable for relational bargains. 0 4 Williamson
identifies uncertainty, frequency of exchange, and the degree to which
investments are transaction-specific' 0 5 as important characteristics that
separate relational situations from traditional contractual arrangements.1 0 6
Most importantly, Williamson and Professor Victor Goldberg identify some
regulated industries to which Macneil's relational theory applies and attempt
to build a justification for regulation based on that insight. 0 7 Goldberg, for
example, argues:
The paradigmatic contract of economic theory (and of law) is a discrete transaction
conveying a well-defined object . . .in exchange for cash. This characterization is
adequate for many purposes but it diverts attention from some aspects of contract that
will be of particular significance in a regulatory context. This discrete transactional
mold is apt to be singularly inappropriate for representing relations which are to take
place over a long period of time and in which the parties will have to deal with each
other regularly over a wide range of issues (many of them unknown in advance) ....
By attempting to analyze regulation within a discrete transaction framework,
economists have suppressed the most significant aspects of the regulatory
08
arrangement and this has led to an overstatement of the case against regulation.1

It is interesting and fruitful to apply the relational contractual approach to
regulation in a potential bankruptcy setting.
In developing his justification for regulation, Goldberg notes another
feature of relational contracts that the discrete transactional mode of
traditional contract theory suppresses. "A second suppressed problem
concerns the reliance of individuals on agents (for gathering information,
making decisions, negotiating contracts, adjusting the terms of ongoing
relationships, and so on.)"' 1 9 He regards the suppression of ongoing
relationships and reliance on agents as distinctive characteristics of properly
regulated areas and uses this insight to defend regulation against recent
attacks. Although not concerned with the implications of his theory for
bankruptcy, Goldberg's emphasis on the role of agency in regulated
Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982). See also McDonnell, The Bank-Customer Relationship, in 3
LAw (T. Eisenberg ed. 1985).

DEBTOR-CREDITOR

104. Williamson I, supra note 17.
105. Williamson describes his notion of transaction-specific costs in id. at 239-45. Examples of
physical capital that are transaction specific are "(1) the purchase of a specialized component from an
outside supplier or (2) the location of a specialized plant in a unique, proximate relation to a
downstream processing stage to which it supplies vital input." Id. at 242. He notes that transactionspecific investments in human capital include craftsmanship. Id. at 243.
106. Id. at 261.
107. See Goldberg, supra note 17; Williamson I, supra note 17.
108. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 426-27 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 427.
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industries suggests that flaws in the performance of the agent might warrant
further regulation.
For convenience, Goldberg makes the "wildly unrealistic assumption" that
"the agent is a faithful representative of his principals' interests.""10 The
utility commissioner or public advocate is thus assumed to be a perfect,
faithful representative of ratepayer interests. If that assumption is relaxed,
what can be done about the commission that is "captured" by a utility
industry or is otherwise imperfectly representing ratepayers? If improper
decisions by the commission-agent lead to misallocations of resources
through unwarranted rate increases, a case for further regulation may exist.
Bankruptcy can again be thought of as extended regulation patching a
representational flaw in the basic regulatory framework. Indeed, all of
bankruptcy law can be thought of as a kind of catch-as-catch-can patch to
financial ventures that did not work.II'
IV
THE LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY

Part II suggests discounting the more pessimistic projections about the
fiscal effect of bankruptcy on a utility. Bankruptcy may yield positive fiscal
effects for a utility already in trouble. Part III suggests that bankruptcy may
provide a useful mechanism for enhancing the goals of administrative law.
Specifically, bankruptcy may provide an enhanced scheme of representation.
Neither set of benefits, however, is without costs. This part explores some of
the costs associated with providing fiscal relief and enhanced representation.
It then takes up bankruptcy-related variations on valuation problems that
exist outside of bankruptcy. Finally, it turns to some problems unique to
bankruptcy. Initially, however, it is appropriate to explore whether
bankruptcy is a proper mechanism for securing whatever gains may be
obtained through additional regulation.
I10.

Id. at 430.
111. Another economic view of regulation justifies it on the ground that it lowers systematic risk,
that is, lowers the risks of extreme profit or price fluctuations for producers and consumers, thereby
reducing the effects of exogenous shocks. See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. ECON. 291 (1974); B. OWEN & R.
BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1978);
Shaffer, Regulation and Risk Preferences, 32 J. INDUS. ECON. 349 (1984). But see Keran, Inflation,
Regulation and Utility Stock Prices, 7 BELLJ. ECON. 268 (1976); Chandrasekaran & Dukes, Risk Variables
Affecting Rate of Return of Public Utilities, 107 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 32, Feb. 26, 1981. For an empirical
study supporting the risk-reduction hypothesis, see Norton, Regulation and Systematic Risk: The Case of
Electric Utilities, 28 J.L. ECON. 671 (1985).
If regulation is to be supported on the risk-reduction basis, then extreme increases in financing
costs and consumer prices are powerful evidence of regulatory failure. Thus, where New
Hampshire's Seabrook plant results in 22% financing costs and expected rate increases of 100% and
200% over the next several years, see CAMPAIGN FOR RATEPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 63, normal
regulation may be said to have failed, and some supplementary regulation, perhaps in the form of
bankruptcy, may be in order. In the economists' parlance, one might call this a new "governance
structure." See Goldberg, supra note 17; Williamson I, supra note 17.
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Why Bankruptcy as the Supplementary Regulatory Mechanism?

If one accepts "flawed agency" as a basis for further utility regulation or
accepts the earlier discussion of representation as supporting further public
action, the additional regulation must be by an entity other than utility
commissioners. Bankruptcy, however, is not the only possible additional
regulatory mechanism. Additional state regulation may be achieved through
more active judicial review of agency decisions, or through the utilization of
public advocates, existing federal agencies, new state agencies, or some new
federal agency.
Each alternative supplementary mechanism nonetheless will likely raise
problems of its own. State rules ofjudicial review may be too narrow and may
not regard the agency as part of the problem. Public advocates may be
imperfect agents for want of adequate resources or sufficient independence.
New federal or state agencies may be subject to the same pressures that
affected the concededly imperfect utility commissioners. In addition, new
agencies may require a substantial new infrastructure solely for what may turn
out to be a narrow class of problems. Hence, new agencies may not be cost
effective. All of these mechanisms, to the extent they are new, also take time
to establish. Utilities and ratepayers face an immediate problem.
Bankruptcy's infrastructure, by contrast, is already in place. Bankruptcy
thus provides a politically independent, immediately available, supplementary
regulatory mechanism without large and new overhead costs. Bankruptcy is
not the only plausible supplementary regulatory system. Nevertheless, some
further regulation may be warranted and bankruptcy is available now. Any
other supplementary system that realistically might be in place in time to
affect the instant problem should also receive serious consideration. Any such
system likely would share some of the costs and benefits discussed here under
bankruptcy's banner.
Among the benefits bankruptcy may bring to the regulatory arena is a
federal court system providing uniform treatment of a nationwide problem.
Resolving the current crisis in the nonbankruptcy setting promises results
ranging from full absorption of costs by ratepayers to full absorption by
investors. 112 The stakes are so large that the variety of results that must
attend solutions by local regulatory authorities may not be welcome. The
ratepayer in New Hampshire whose utility rates increase by 100 percent from
bringing Seabrook on-line will not appreciate learning that elsewhere a
similarly situated ratepayer bore none of that cost."13 Bankruptcy courts,
subject to appellate review in a single court system, offer some hope of a
uniform solution without providing a federal bailout of the industry." 14
112.

See supra note 20.
113. This is based on the assumption that the terms of regulation are the same in both states.
There are important interstate differences in the makeup of utility rates. See infra text accompanying
notes 188-93.
114. Use of the term "uniform solution" is not intended to suggest that the results with respect to
each troubled utility must be the same. The regulatory environment for each utility varies from state
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A regional or national approach to regulation is particularly attractive in
the case of failed nuclear power plants."t 5 Federal regulation, through the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), affects the costs of construction, the
timing, the licensing, and the operation of such plants." 16 Much of the plants'
costs stem from safety measures for which the NRC is primarily responsible.
Transfers of control of nuclear plants are subject to NRC approval. 1 7 The
NRC shares responsibility for controlling utilities with other regulatory
agencies. The Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) is responsible
for setting rates for the interstate sale of electric power, usually sales by one
utility to another." l8 The SEC has authority over many of the financial
activities of registered utility holding companies.' t ' In addition to being
subject to this complex scheme of federal regulation, nuclear plants may be
owned by utilities in several jurisdictions.' 20 The regulatory authorities in
those jurisdictions may allocate the costs of the same failed plant
differently. 12' Abandonment of such plants thus seems to call for a regional
or national perspective to regulation. Bankruptcy provides such a
perspective.
As the foregoing suggests, bankruptcy may function as an effective
regulatory mechanism. Bankruptcy promises a uniform approach to the
to state. Ideally, use of the federal court system would promote similar results for ratepayers and
investors in similar regulatory environments.
115. See generally Zitser, The Nuclear Plant Problem Needs A Federal Solution, 113 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 22,
Mar. 29, 1984.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2011-2296 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
117. Id. § 2131 (1982).
118. Id. §§ 7171, 7191-93. Consider the following description of FERC proceedings:
Proceedings before the FERC are less frequently adversarial in nature than those before state
regulatory commissions inasmuch as the purchasers of the electricity are usually retail electric
utilities which may flow the costs through to their own retail customers without question by the
state regulatory authorities. The proceedings are generally far removed geographically from the
ultimate ratepayers and are, therefore, less political and time consuming. FERC has also shown
itself to be less stringent than many state commissions in the allowance of construction work in
progress (CWIP) into a rate base and the treatment of cancelled investment for ratemaking
purposes. As a result, an increasing number of utilities are creating subsidiaries or affiliated
corporations for the generation and transmission of electricity so that all of their power supply
costs would be regulated by FERC rather than at the state level.
MASS. CoNT. LEGAL EDUC., INC., BANKRUPTCY CODE AMENDMENTS-A UTILITY IN CHAPTER 11, at

134

(1984). But see P. NAVARRO, THE DIMMING OF AMERICA 114 (1985) ("Wall Street considers the FERC
to be at least as rate-suppressive as a majority of the state PUC's."). See generally Mid-Tex Elec. Coop.
v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reviewing and remainding FERC's proposed rule allowing
wholesale sellers of electricity to include in their rate base 50% of their investment in construction
work in progress). For FERC's interim response to Mid-Tex, see FERC Acts to Facilitate Transition to
Order 436 and Modifies CWIP with Interim Rule, 117 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 41, 43-44, Apr. 17, 1986.
119. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, title 1, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a
to 79z-6 (1982) (PUHCA). The PUHCA has its own reorganization provisions. In 1976, it was
reported that only one-third of the utility industry was subject to the PUHCA. Katzin, Electric Utility
Financing Today, 55 OR. L. REV. 479, 486 (1976).
120. Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 138 n.9.
121. Compare South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982) (sustaining
FERC allocation of costs of cancelled nuclear plant built by a utility with multijurisdictional plants),
with In re Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1981) (limiting recovery of costs of abandoned nuclear power plant despite the existence of an
interstate coordinating agreement allocating costs between multijurisdictional plants).
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problems currently faced by troubled utilities. The utilization of bankruptcy
as such a mechanism, however, is not without costs. An examination of these
costs is critical to an evaluation of bankruptcy as a supplementary regulatory
mechanism.
B.

The Costs of Enhanced Representation

Outside bankruptcy, "the problems in assuring representation of all
affected interests . . .are determining which interests are to be represented
and the means by which such representation is to be provided."' 22 In
proceedings before an agency, a choice must be made among the groups
claiming an interest in the proceedings. Those who purport to speak for the
"public interest" represent at most an important subset of that interest, a
subset often of the attorney's choosing.' 23 The dollar costs of enhanced
representation are also important. Much discussion of public interest
representation concerns whether the agency itself or the government should
fund public interest participation and whether litigation expenses should be
awarded to the public interest representatives by the agencies.' 24 Perhaps
most importantly, delay is a cost of broad representation. In nonbankruptcy
regulatory settings, delay is a recognized price paid for widespread
25
participation. 1
Enhanced or modified representation through bankruptcy is neither a
guarantee of "correct" substantive results nor a goal achievable without costs.
One cost is the shift of some decisionmaking responsibility from a politically
accountable body, the regulatory agency, to the courts.126 Other costs attend
the determination of who is entitled to representation 2 7 and who is to pay for
representation. In addition, wider representation imposes costly delay.' 2 8
1. The Shift in Accountability. The control of unelected agency officials
over much of modem life has traditionally been justified by their conduit-like
function: Politically accountable legislators make the rules; administrators
merely enforce them. 129 If modem administrative agencies in fact operate
within the traditional model and merely implement legislative directives, a
122. Stewart, supra note 13, at 1762.
123. See Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-ThePublic Interest in Public Interest Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1765.
124. See Bonfield, Representationfor the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REv. 511 (1969);
Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972); Lazarus & Onek, The
Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1609 (1971).
125. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13, at 1770-76.
126. In the loosest sense, bankruptcy judges, who are not appointed for life, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 152(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986), might be viewed as more politically accountable than other federal
judges. But bankruptcy judges' terms are lengthy enough, id. (14 years), and their decisions are
subject to review by district and circuit court judges, id. § 158. Hence, their decisions are perhaps as
politically accountable as those of other federal judges.
127. See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1762-70.
128. See id at 1770-76.
129. Id. at 1672-73.
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loss in accountability will result from sharing decisionmaking with a
bankruptcy court.
With the growth of agency discretion, however, administrators are more
like legislators and less like technocrats who merely implement legislative
policy.' 3 0 Even in their capacity as ratemakers, modern regulators pass
implicit judgment on the desirability of such politically charged programs as
nuclear power and conservation. Today, unelected agency officials are
perhaps no more politically accountable than judges. 131 Sharing traditional
agency decisions with a bankruptcy court, therefore, does not substantially
decrease political accountability.
2. Reassessing Other Costs in Bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy does not
substantially decrease political accountability, the other costs of enhanced
representation do not disappear in bankruptcy. Indeed, conventional wisdom
dictates that concern about one cost-delay-should increase in bankruptcy.
But the costs must be considered in the bankruptcy context, in which they
take on a different flavor and are on the whole of no greater concern than they
are outside of bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy context, delay may even be a
positive factor.
Much of the representational enhancement that bankruptcy offers differs
from the free-floating selection of interests to be represented in
nonbankruptcy regulatory proceedings. That enhancement does not come so
much from selecting groups for representation as from reassessing the
importance of the interests of groups already represented. In most situations,
the players in the bankruptcy game are determined in advance by
prebankruptcy occurrences. The muting of management interests and the
scaling down of old, wounded investor interests are more concessions to
economic reality than they are power plays to provide others with a voice.
The costs of the representational scheme may be allocated differently in
bankruptcy than they are outside of bankruptcy. Outside bankruptcy, each
group usually bears its own costs, absent some fee shifting mechanism. Even
a state such as California, which allows those representing consumer interests
to be reimbursed, may limit reimbursement to situations in which the
consumer makes a "substantial contribution" to the adoption of the
regulatory authority's order. 3 2 This limitation assures that groups seeking
participation have a significant interest in the proceedings. 13 3
130. See id. at 1683.
131. Id. at 1790. Utility regulators are elected in nine states. P. NAVARRO, supra note 118, at 98.
132. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1803(a) (West Supp. 1986). As a prerequisite to reimbursements,
California law also requires a showing that participation without an award of fees or costs imposes a
significant financial hardship. Id. § 1803(b).
133. But much of the public interest participation is funded by lawyers working at below market
rates, by private firms supporting pro bono work, and by foundations. See, e.g., Heineman, Book
Review, 84 YALE L.J. 182, 185-87 (1974) (reviewing S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974));
Stewart, supra note 13, at 1763.
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In bankruptcy, the participation costs of those with officially recognized
interests are borne by the bankruptcy estate, 3 4 thereby reducing the amount
available for distribution to creditors and investors and increasing the
debtor's funding needs. Those possessing well-established claims against a
debtor who is able to pay administrative expenses are assured of
reimbursement. Those with marginal claims that may be disallowed or those
fighting for novel theories of participation are less certain of reimbursement.
This possibility provides some incentive for those with marginal claims to
representation to keep costs under control.
3. Increased Concern in Bankruptcy About Delay. A final cost associated with
enhanced representation is the cost of delay. For the financially healthy
business, the delay attending broader or rearranged representation may be a
cost of securing the public benefits of regulation. For the financially
distressed business, the extra burdens imposed by delay may signal the
dividing line between regulation that provides a net gain and that which
provides a net loss. Much of the concern about regulation and representation
in bankruptcy is thus concern about time.
Modification of "normal" regulation in bankruptcy often seeks to prevent
delay. The SEC, with limited rights of participation, plays a muted role under
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.' 3 5 Reorganization plans need not be submitted
to state regulators in advance. Ex parte modifications of labor agreements
permit action before it is too late to save the distressed business.' 3 6 The need
for speed is perceived as a dominant factor.
Why does this heightened sensitivity to delay exist in bankruptcy?
Financially, the debtor is unlikely to be worse off the day after the petition is
filed than the day before; however, the psychology of commercial situations is
important. Bankruptcy sends a signal to everyone dealing with a bankrupt
debtor: "Get out now with as much as you can as fast as you can." With
respect to the bankrupt debtor, bankruptcy suggests that there is no longterm worth worrying about. Suppliers are less likely to ship for fear of not
being paid. Customers are less likely to order for fear of not being able to rely
on the debtor's existence, much less the debtor's timely performance.
37
Employees and managers become nervous and less faithful and may leave.'
134. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328, 330-31 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
135. Id. § 1109(a) (1982) (SEC has no right of appeal); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. 11 1984).
137. Consider the case of a business on the brink of bankruptcy that sells its accounts receivable
to a factor. The price, it has been stated, will be heavily discounted.
[O]nce a manufacturer begins to go under, even his best customers begin refusing payment for
merchandise, claiming defects in quality, failure to meet specifications, tardy delivery, or whathave-you. The great enforcer of morality in commerce is the continuing relationship, the belief
that one will have to do business again with this customer, or this supplier, and when a failing
company loses this automatic enforcer, not even a strong-arm factor is likely to find a substitute.
R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTIoN OF COOPERATION 60 (1984) (quoting M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 280
(1974)). To counter this reaction, according to conventional thinking, a reorganization must be as
speedy as possible. One must convince suppliers, customers, employees, and managers that the
business will emerge quickly from the bankruptcy law umbrella.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. 2

To counter these reactions, conventional thinking dictates that reorganization
be as speedy as possible. Suppliers, customers, employees, and managers
must be convinced that the business will emerge quickly from the bankruptcy
law umbrella.
4. Rethinking Delay in a Utility Bankruptcy. Recent interesting work in
both contract theory and cooperation theory casts doubt upon the dominant
notion that reorganizations must be completed quickly to maximize the
chance of success. It is important to note, however, that the benefits of delay
should not be overemphasized. Obviously, at some point delay will become
too excessive and costly to all involved. Nevertheless, there is room for some
13 8
delay in bankruptcy-delay that may benefit all parties in the long run.
Contract theorists such as Macneil, Williamson, and Goldberg have
supplied a description of the long-term relational foundations of much of
contract.' 3 9 Both Williamson and Goldberg suggest that regulated utilities
are often prime examples of relational contractual situations.' 40 Some of the
features suggesting the presence of relational situations also suggest that
delay should be less of a problem in a utility bankruptcy than perhaps
otherwise expected.
Williamson and Goldberg emphasize the recurrence of exchange or
ongoing relationships as important aspects of relational contracting. Both
also suggest that these relational characteristics attend naturally monopolistic
industries. Ratepayers, like it or not, are in a long-term relationship with their
electric utility. The utility is likely involved in a long-term relationship with its
supplier. If the utility is constructing a plant, the construction is likely to take
long enough to foster other ongoing relationships.
For a debtor involved in long-term relationships, the risks of delay are
perhaps less drastic than they are for the debtor engaged in traditional "oneshot," single transaction exchanges. A utility's customers are not likely to
abandon it in the short term. Some of its important suppliers likely can be
kept on-line during the remainder of a long-term contract. Suppliers may
have an "investment" in the debtor that is not easily transferred.' 4' As
indicated in Part II above, a debtor's new financial suppliers may be better off
lending to the debtor in bankruptcy than before bankruptcy. 4 2 On the other
hand, some minor suppliers may be repelled by a bankruptcy filing.
Furthermore, a debtor whose major supply contracts are about to expire may
138. Bankruptcy recognizes the benefits of some delays. The automatic stay of section 362, 11
U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. II 1984), slows down creditors so that the debtor has time to plan its
rehabilitation without being financially dismembered in the process.
For a discussion of possible benefits of delay in another unexpected context, judicial
administration, see Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal ProcedureandJudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEG.
STUD. 399, 445-48 (1973).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 103-110.
140. See Goldberg, supra note 17; Williamson I, supra note 17.
141. In Williamson's terminology, parties dealing with a utility may have both an ongoing
relation with the utility and transaction-specific costs. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
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find it difficult while in bankruptcy to enter into new long-term arrangements
without offering some security or assurance to the nonbankrupt party.
These considerations suggest that marginally increased delay in
bankruptcy is unlikely to be disastrous or even severely threatening to most
utilities in chapter 11. Although increased delay may be a significant concern
for utilities with important supply contracts about to expire, this is not a basis
for shunning bankruptcy across the board.
Cooperation theory takes analysis of delay one step further. The relational
contract theorists use their insights to select appropriate governance
structures. They do not address the question whether long-term relations are
normatively more desirable than single-shot transactions. Contract theorists
reveal merely that ongoing relations are a characteristic of relational
contracts. They view the parties to contracts as able to determine the most
efficient relationship. Under this contractual analysis, the presence of
ongoing relations reduces concern about delay for relational debtors.
Contractual analysis, however, does not suggest that delay can be a positive
force.
In contrast, cooperation theorists supply a normative analysis suggesting
that the long-term view may be desirable because it helps achieve the benefits
of cooperative behavior. Consider, for example, Robert Axelrod's summary:
The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the
relationship. When the conditions are right, the players can come to cooperate with
each other through trial-and-error learning about possibilities for mutual rewards,
through imitation of other successful players, or even through a blind process of
selection of the more successful strategies with a weeding out of the less successful
ones. Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run
than whether the14conditions
are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation
3
with each other.

If people must get along for a minute, they may do so, but they have little
incentive to probe for mutually beneficial transactions. If they must get along
for a year, they have dramatically different incentives. If long-term
relationships generate cooperative behavior, and cooperative behavior yields
economic payoffs, then long-term relationships may be normatively desirable.
Perhaps a government normally willing to let the private market function on
its own should consider fostering long-term relations when a debtor needs
help.
Thus, one important task of a bankruptcy law may be to convince the
debtors' relations that there is a long term worth worrying about or at least to
raise the cost to the debtor' relations of disentangling themselves from the
debtor. Various means of implementing these objectives exist. The debtor's
relations may be assured that the bankrupt entity will be supported by the
government so as to insure its survival for a period long enough to count as
"long-term." Chrysler's experience attests to the success of such a venture in
143.

R.

AXELROD,

supra note 137, at 182.
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a nonbankruptcy setting. 4 4 This survival by governmental fiat, however, is
not something any particular debtor can rely upon, 14 5 is subject to abuse, and
is politically incapable of exploitation on a broad basis.
Alternatively, incentives may be supplied to creditors to encourage
continued dealings with the bankrupt debtor. Bankruptcy law provides such
incentives in various ways. Those who deal with the debtor after the filing of a
bankruptcy petition are entitled to an administrative priority and thus rank
ahead of prepetition unsecured claims. 14 6 Banks are subtly encouraged not to
exercise their state law rights of setoff, 1 4 7 and postpetition lenders receive
48
special priority treatment.1
Government can accomplish some of the same results by imposing delays,
such as those accompanying a bankruptcy law, on interactions with a debtor.
The inability of the debtor's relations immediately to extricate themselves
from involvement with the debtor becomes a reality unto itself. The debtor's
relations must think in terms of long-term interactions because they find
themselves in a long-term relation. The "get-out-now" mentality is
cushioned by planning in light of the new, longer relationship with the debtor.
All parties have increased incentives to discover mutually beneficial
transactions. The payoff is a larger pie for all of the relations to share.
These possible benefits should reduce concern about enhancing
representation or permitting normal regulation, such as SEC participation, to
function in bankruptcy. And again, the nonbankruptcy reality must be
acknowledged: If a business is going to deteriorate, it will likely do so
whether or not representation is broadened or whether the SEC is entitled to
full participation in bankruptcy. The deterioration curve for a business may
be steep shortly before and shortly after bankruptcy. The marginal delay
added by enhanced representation or regulatory participation is not likely to
be the factor causing a failed reorganization.
C.

New Twists on Old Valuation Problems

1. The Value of the Firm. Valuing the firm, always a difficult problem,
might seem exacerbated in the case of a utility bankruptcy. The authority to
scale down debt and equity in any reorganizing firm depends on the
liquidation value and the going concern value the bankruptcy court assigns to
the firm. At the extreme, if a bankruptcy court finds that the debtor has a
144. See Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1325
(1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1982)) (authorizing federal loan guarantees of up to
$1.5 billion).
145. Nevertheless, it is common to hear that an industry or entity near bankruptcy is counting
upon government assistance. See Morgan Stanley Report, supra note 47 (possible federal aid for
nuclear utilities); Kempton, Outrageowly Normal, N.Y. REV. BoOKS, Jan. 30, 1986, at 31 (referring to
proposed 1980 legislation to bail out Manville).
146. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
147. Id. § 553. The encouragement is through the enhanced postpetition setoff rights embodied
in this section. These rights come at the cost of having to request court permission to engage in
postpetition setoff.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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liquidation value equal to the sum of its liabilities and shareholder interests,
then a reorganization plan must pay every creditor in full and cannot reduce
any shareholder interest. A reorganization plan must provide that holders of
claims or interests will receive at least as much as they would receive if the
49
firm were liquidated.
Putting aside the unusual case of a healthy bankrupt entity, the degree to
which claims or interests participate in the reorganization is governed by the
bankruptcy court's determination of the firm's going concern value. Every
class of creditors or claims that is senior to another class must be paid in full
before the subordinate class may participate.' 5 0 A bankruptcy court will thus
likely be required to determine both the liquidation value and the going
concern value of a financially troubled utility.
But how does one determine the value of a firm whose discounted stream
of earnings, the usual measure of going concern value,' 5 ' depends on the
rates established by a state regulatory authority? In the short term, the value
of a regulated utility is determined by the rates set by the regulatory authority.
The valuation problem faced by the bankruptcy court is not, however,
different in kind from the state authority's determination outside of
bankruptcy. In deciding the proper rate of return for investors and the
appropriate burden on ratepayers, the state authority is, de facto, determining
the value of the firm. The bankruptcy court may engage in a similar endeavor,
but for a different purpose: to determine who participates in the bankruptcy.
Again, what actually happens to a utility in bankruptcy is not the central
concern. Rather, it is the utility regulators' perception of what happens. If
regulators regard bankruptcy as an unmitigated disaster for the utility and the
community, near unlimited rate increases will likely be invoked to maintain
the utility's solvency. If the regulators have a more informed, less apocalyptic
view of bankruptcy, however, they may decide that a scaling down of existing
obligations is appropriate and that bankruptcy provides a reasonable forum in
which the scaling down can occur.
2. Allocating Appreciated Assets. A related difficult valuation question
arises in deciding how to account for appreciation in a utility's assets.
Consider a utility with excess capacity that owns a plant carried on the utility's
books at $200 million and included in the rate base at that figure. The plant
has become worth $500 million owing to inflation and appreciation. Sale of
the plant will generate a large gain. Unless the selling utility is required to
dedicate some or all of the gain to ratepayers, selling appreciated plants or
149. Each holder of an impaired claim or interest must accept a reorganization plan or "receive
or retain under the plan ... property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less
than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date .
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
150. Id. § 1129(b).
151. See, e.g., J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 233-66 (1937). But see Roe, Bankruptcy
and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
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assets or pledging them as collateral for new loans may become the means of
financing economically questionable plants.
The implications of such a practice are troubling.
If utilities have the right to charge ratepayers for expensive new generating plants, at
cost, in the early years, when the power may not be economically competitive, and
then sell off the asset to another entity once inflation makes the power cost-effective,
and keep the profit for the stockholders, ratepayers are in an untenable bind. Every
coal plant in the country built more than 5 years ago will change hands, as will all of
the nuclear plants placed in operation prior to 1980,
so that utilities can revise their
52
rate base up to "replacement cost" or fair value.'

The question of how to allocate such appreciation is likely to be critical in a
utility bankruptcy. Is this a special bankruptcy-related problem?
In one perspective, the allocation of appreciation does not present a novel
issue. The question of how to account for such a sale may arise outside of
bankruptcy in the context of an application for regulatory approval of transfer
of the plant. Pursuant to its grant of approval, the regulatory authority may
extract a share of the profits from the transfer for ratepayers. Hence,
regulatory commissions and the courts reviewing their decisions frequently
encounter the question of how to allocate gains between ratepayers and
investors.
If there is a "rule" for allocating gains, it seems to be that gains on the sale
of depreciable property go to ratepayers, t5 3 who are viewed as having
"bought" the wasting assets through rate payments. On the other hand, gains
on the sale of nondepreciable property (land) belong to investors.' 54 No
single rule, however, is universally followed, and support exists for a rule that
152. Lazar, Do or Die: The Seabrook Nuclear Generating Station and the Public Service
Company of New Hampshire, at 8 (on file with author).
153. See Bebchick v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 485 F.2d 858, 873 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450 A.2d 1187, 1237 (D.C. 1982)
(gain on sale of propane reserves to ratepayers); Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 99
Idaho 158, 162, 578 P.2d 1089, 1092-93 (1978); Maine Water Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 482 A.2d
443, 448 (Me. 1984); Cacso Bay Lines v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 483, 489 (Me. 1978); In re
Revision in Rates Filed by Plainfield-Union Water Co., 57 N.J. Super. 158, 176-77, 154 A.2d 201, 211
(1959); In re Procedures for Implementing the Detariffing of Customer Premises Equipment and
Enhanced Services (second computer inquiry), 94 F.C.C.2d 76, 78 (1983) (notice of proposed
rulemaking). But see Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23, 32 (1926) ("By
paying bills for service [customers] do not acquire any interest, legal or equitable, in the property
used for their convenience or in the funds of the company."); In re Associated Natural Gas Co., 55
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 702, 707 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983) (but decision is "not indicative of
a general policy to treat gain on sale of utility property in this manner. . . in future cases"); Gas Co.
of N.M. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 100 N.M. 740, 676 P.2d 817 (1984) (following New York
Telephone); Accounting Treatment to Account for Gains and Losses on the Disposition of Utility
Property that Had Been Classified in Utility Service and Consolidation of Certain Depreciation
Accounts, 49 F.P.C. 390, 391 (1973) (implementing rulemaking).
154. Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 99 Idaho 158, 162, 578 P.2d 1089, 1093
(1978); City of Lexington v. Lexington Water Co., 458 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Ky. 1970); Maine Water Co.
v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 482 A.2d 443, 448 (Me. 1984); Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 72 Pa. Commw. 331, 355-56, 456 A.2d 1126, 1137-38 (1983), rev'd
sub nom. Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 482 A.2d 1274 (1984); Philadelphia Suburban
Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 58 Pa. Commw. 272, 280, 427 A.2d 1244, 1248
(1981); Washington Pub. Interest Org. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, STATE UnL. L. REP.
23,668 (D.C.
1982). But see Democratic Central Comm. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 485
F.2d 786, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
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the gain on an investment should go to the group that bore the risk of loss,
with a determination of the appropriate group left to the facts of each case. 15 5
In the bankruptcy of a utility with appreciated assets, a court will have to
address the question of allocating unrealized appreciation. The accounting
question presents two interesting added twists in the bankruptcy setting. On

the practical level, the question is more difficult because it arises in the
context of valuing the firm, with no actual transfer contemplated. This adds
another valuation matter to a bankruptcy court's long list of likely valuations.
During the proceedings, however, the bankruptcy court will already be
valuing many assets as well as the firm. Therefore, this subclass of valuations
involving appreciated assets need not be viewed as a major separate problem.
The marginal burden or complexity added by the need to value appreciated
assets may be de minimis.
More serious, however, is the problem of allocating the appreciation
among the bankruptcy participants. An instinctive reaction of the bankruptcy
court might be to regard such value as being dedicated first to creditors,
traditionally the highest ranking group in a bankruptcy, and then to
shareholders. Ratepayers, being neither classic lenders nor classic creditors,
do not fit comfortably within traditional bankruptcy categories. Perhaps the
plant should be valued for bankruptcy purposes in the same manner it is
valued for rate-base purposes. Historical cost might then be substituted for
current value. Alternatively, the bankruptcy court could take account of any
foreseeable nonbankruptcy regulatory requirement that the ratepayers share
in the profit. The value of the plant or other assets would then reflect any
likely regulatory restrictions on the transfer of assets outside of bankruptcy.
Lenders, particularly secured lenders, may extend credit in reliance on the
fair market value of the utility's assets as well as on the basis of the utility's
historical cost and rate base. Nevertheless, given lenders' experience with
railroads, they should be aware that utility plants cannot simply be sold to
outsiders who may discontinue service or increase rates. A bankruptcy
valuation scheme that is premised on liquidating sales is not a realistic
alternative, and this is known to lenders at the time they extend credit. At the
very least, secured lenders who extend credit to utilities should be subject to
the same unreimbursed delay in selling off operating assets that was imposed
15 6
upon lenders to railroads.
155. See Kansas Power & Light Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 5 Kan. App. 2d 514, 529, 620 P.2d
329, 341 (1980) (stockholders and ratepayers should both benefit from profit on sale of utility's office
building); Committee Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 595 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah 1979); In re El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 23 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 66, 92 (FERC 1977) (balancing ratepayer and
stockholder interests in the case of an abandonment); minority authority cited supra notes 153-54.
See also In re Florida Power & Light Co., STATE UTIL. L. REP.
23,457 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981);
Note, Awarding In-Service Appreciation to Public Utility Ratepayers- Windfall or Perdition?, 11 CALIF. W. L.
REV. 160 (1974).
156. See generally Graybeal, Reflections on the Golden Spike: A Look at the Bankruptcy Reform Act and
Railroad Reorganization, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1107 (1979); Note, Conrail and Liquidation Value:
Creditors' and Stockholders' Entitlement in the Regional Rail Reorganization, 85 YALE L.J. 371 (1976); cf
Clearwater County State Bank v. Bagley-Ogema Tel. Co., 116 Minn 4, 133 N.W. 91 (1911)
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PROBLEMS

These allocation problems also exist outside of bankruptcy, for the
regulatory authority must itself determine a proper rate of return for equity
and debt in a utility. In doing so, the authority faces questions resembling
those that attend the valuation of a firm. 15 7 This suggests that the allocationof-appreciation question is less a problem peculiar to bankruptcy than it is a
problem of the ultimate allocation of risk between shareholders and
ratepayers. Discussion of that question is deferred to Part V.
D.

New Problems in Bankruptcy

1. Uncertainty. Because there have been no major utility bankruptcies in
recent years, uncertainty attends the course of a utility reorganization.15 8 The
postpetition cost of capital, attitudes towards methods of valuation, allocation
of unrealized appreciation, and the role of regulators are all issues with
respect to which our system lacks much actual experience. This uncertainty
has been offered as a prime reason for keeping utilities outside bankruptcy.
Costs of this uncertainty must be balanced against bankruptcy's potential
benefits as outlined in Parts II and III.
In considering the role of uncertainty, the burden of uncertainty in
bankruptcy should be compared to the burden of uncertainty outside of
bankruptcy. A troubled utility outside bankruptcy is not a model of stability
and long-term planning opportunity. One constantly reads of utilities being
on the brink of bankruptcy, 59 petitioning for an "absolutely necessary" rate
increase, 160 engaging in creative financing,' 6' commencing extraordinary
court actions, 16 2 considering whether to withdraw as a partner from a major
project,' 6 3 considering and studying bankruptcy, 164 being considered for
takeover by the state, 65 defaulting on obligations, 66 deferring or canceling
(modifying

statutory

redemption

rights

where

mortgage

covers

property

of quasi

public

corporation).
1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 42-54 (1970).
158. Of course it is doubtful that a single utility chapter 1I proceeding would have resolved all or
even most uncertainties for later proceedings.
159. See supra note 5; In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349 (N.H. Pub.
157.

Util. Comm'n 1985); Dahl, Kansas G&E Calls Rate Increase Crucial to Prevent CripplingFirm, Wall St.J.,
Aug. 29, 1985, at 6, col. 3; Burrough, Middle South Seen Near Filingfor Chapter 11, Wall St.J., Aug. 16,

1985, at 3, col. 1.
160.

See PS of Indiana Gets Extension on Loans Totaling $200 Million, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1985, at 20,

col. 4 (Pub. Serv. Co. of Indiana receives $200 million credit extension and needs to recover its
investment in a nuclear plant to preserve its existence).
161. See In re Seabrook Unit No. 1, 63 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 401 (Conn. Dept. Pub. Util.
Control 1984) (describing extraordinary financing vehicle and noting that absent extraordinary
financing PSCNH would be in bankruptcy).
162. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Ackel, 616 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. La. 1985) (dismissal
of action seeking injunction to require Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n to grant increase in intrastate
electric utility rates); Middle South Units'Suitsfor Rate Rises Dismissed, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1985, at 12,

col. 2 (same).
163. See Wessel, Investor Group Seeks to Buy 9. 77 of Seabrook Plant, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1985, at 20,
col. 2; Wessel, Vermont Utilities Are Told to Sell Stake in Seabrook Unit 1, Wall St. J., May 6, 1985, at 28,
col. 3; Vermont Utilities Orderd to Sell Seabrook Shares, Boston Globe, May 4, 1985, at 8, col. 1.

164. See supra authorities cited note 159.
165. See Public Electric Power on Long Island-Study and Report, 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 2, § 2
($500,000 appropriated "in support of an investigation and evaluation of the economic, legal,
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dividends, 16 7 or being subjected to extraordinary regulatory divestment
orders. 68 In general, bankruptcy will not dramatically increase uncertainty.
Most of the uncertainty that attends troubled nuclear utilities exists because
they face difficult problems-problems that are about as intractable outside
bankruptcy as inside bankruptcy. The forum in which those problems are
addressed is a secondary matter.
One measure of the cost of uncertainty is the return a debtor must offer its
investors. As noted above, a considerable price is being paid for economic
uncertainty in the current nonbankruptcy setting in which most utilities
operate. High, sometimes extraordinarily high, financing costs are paid by
financially troubled utilities.16 9 These costs stem from the utilities' uncertain
financial future associated with the fact that current debt generally does not
rank ahead of previously incurred debt. Again, the nonbankruptcy setting is
no panacea.
2. Costs of Bankruptcy and Coordination. Two classes of bankruptcy costs
have no direct analog in a nonbankruptcy setting. First, bankruptcy generates
its own administrative costs. A trustee, if appointed, must be paid. When
creditors' and shareholders' committees are formed, they will likely retain
counsel and other expensive experts. Jurisdictional disputes may arise over
whether a bankruptcy court or a district court should hear a matter. In
addition, unforeseeable issues may arise that prompt the parties to seek a
court ruling where none would be sought outside bankruptcy.
Empirical evidence about the administrative costs of bankruptcy is sketchy.
Professor Warner's study of eleven railroad bankruptcies occurring between
1933 and 1955 reports that bankruptcy administrative costs, measured as a
fraction of the firm's value on the date of bankruptcy, consumed a mean of
5.3% of the firms' assets, with a range of 1.7% to 9.3%.170 Warner also found
a significant scaling effect. Bankruptcy administrative costs are a lower
percentage of the firm's prebankruptcy value for larger firms than they are for
smaller firms. Professors Ang, Chua, and McConnell studied a random
sample of eighty-six bankruptcy liquidation cases filed in the Western District
of Oklahoma. They found the ratio of administrative costs to total liquidating
financial and structural feasibility of the transition to or implementation of public power on Long
Island"). See also Paul, Lilo Banks to Refinance $1 Billion Debt as PressureGrowsfor State Takeover, Wall St.
J.,Jan. 8, 1986, at 4, col. 2; Paul, Cuomo Backs Idea of PowerAuthority to Replace Lilco, Wall St.J., Oct. 25,

1985, at 6, col. 2.
166. FitchburgDefaults on Seabrook, Boston Globe, May 16, 1985, at 51.
167. Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 26, col. 3 (noting omission by Louisiana Power & Light Co. of
preferred dividends); PS of New HampshireSays Dividends Hinge on Seabrook 's Finish, Wall St. J., Mar. 22,
1985, at 11, col. 5; Kansas G&E Seeks Re-Hearingof Order on Annual Rate Rise, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1985,

at 12, col. 3 (noting reduction of common dividends); Burrough, Middle South Unit Defers Decision on
Two Dividends, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1985, at 47, col. 1.
168. Wessel, Vermont UtilitiesAre Told to Sell Stake in Seabrook Unit 1, Wall St. J., May 6, 1985, at 28,
col. 3.
169.

See supra note 63.

170. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 343 (1977). Warner defines direct
bankruptcy costs to include "lawyers' and accountants' fees, other professional fees, and the value of
the managerial time spent in administering the bankruptcy." Id. at 338.
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value of the firm to have a mean of 7.5% and a median of 1.7%. t7' They also
found a scaling effect. They concluded, "If we were to extrapolate the results
of our. . . equation to firms with liquidating values in excess of $1.0 million,
the estimated bankruptcy costs would amount to less than 2.0 percent of the
firm's value."' 7 2 Professor Altman studied the bankruptcies of twelve
retailers and seven industrial firms.' 73 In the retail group, he found the ratio
of bankruptcy administrative expenses to the value of the firm to have a mean
of 4.0% and a median of 1.7%; 174 in the industrial group, the mean was 9.8%
75
and the median was 6.47.1
These studies do not provide a firm basis for forecasting the administrative
costs of a utility bankruptcy. They can all be distinguished, as they do not
focus on electric utilities. 176 The studies, however, are the only available data.
Given the observed scaling effect and the size of electric utilities, the studies
suggest expected bankruptcy administrative costs of less than two percent of a
77
utility's value.'
One might compare this figure with the percentage of a utility's value
reflected in ongoing nuclear construction. A study of thirty-eight utilities
reveals the average current investment in ongoing nuclear construction to be
thirty-seven percent of their total net plant. 178 If, for any one of these
utilities, bankruptcy would help avoid construction or completion of a
171. Ang, Chua & McConnell, The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note, 37 J. FIN.
219, 223 (1982).
172. Id. at 224.
173. Altman, A Further EmpiricalInvestigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39J. FIN. 1067 (1984).
Altman uses a different measure of firm value than Warner. Id. at 1076. It should be noted that the
finance theorists are less interested in the cost of administering bankruptcy than they are in the effect
of bankruptcy costs on the theory of the firm. Their main goal seems to be to ascertain the costs of a
failed business, a concept that they equate with bankruptcy, rather than the costs of what a lawyer
would term a bankruptcy proceeding.
174. Id. at 1074 (Table I).
175. Id. at 1075 (Table II). The mean results for the retail group were heavily and perhaps
unduly influenced by a single bankruptcy in which the firm had a value of $38.6 million and incurred
bankruptcy costs of over $9 millionl Altman does not discuss a scaling effect, and analysis of his data
suggests that it does not show a statistically significant scaling effect. Neither linear regression nor a
quadratic equation of the form used by Ang, Chua, and McConnell, see Ang, Chua & McConnell,
supra note 171, at 223-24, yielded a statistically significant result on Altman's data.
176. The railroads' special problems perhaps undermine the predictive value of Warner's study.
The Ang, Chua, & McConnell study involved relatively small firms and dealt only with liquidations.
The Altman study was not a random sample, and demonstrates the potential influence of the industry
involved on the magnitude of administrative costs. Furthermore, the finance theorists' primary
interest is in the cost of business failure as it pertains to corporate finance policy, rather than in the
actual costs of bankruptcy. Compare Modigliani & Miller, CorporateIncome Taxes and the Cost of Capital:
A Correction, in AM. ECON. REv.,June 1963, at 433, with Ang, Chua & McConnell, supra note 171, at
219. This concern undoubtedly influences the nature of these studies.
177. This figure is based on the bankruptcy costs of firms with values, as measured by the authors
of the empirical studies, in excess of $100 million on the date of bankruptcy. In the Warner study
and the Ang, Chua, & McConnell study, there were a total of four such firms. Their bankruptcy costs
were .6%, .3%, 4.7%, and 1.7% of the value of the firm on the date of bankruptcy, respectively. The
figure is also within the range forecast by Ang, Chua & McConnell, supra at text accompanying note
171.
178. Nucleonics Week, at 4 (Mar. 27. 1986) (Donaldson, Lufkin &Jenerette study) (available on
NEXIS).
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questionable nuclear plant, even the straight dollar comparisons favor
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy's administrative costs must be adjusted to reflect similar costs
being incurred outside bankruptcy. Bankruptcy experts already testify in rate
proceedings of some nonbankrupt utilities. 79 State regulators' opinions treat
bankruptcy as a major contingency, even if one to be avoided.' 8 0 Troubled
utilities engage in elaborate and costly planning in efforts to obtain rate
increases.' 8 ' Thus, some bankruptcy costs replace costs currently being
incurred in speculating about the effects of bankruptcy. So long as
bankruptcy is regarded as a possible alternative, it is destined to generate
nontrivial costs whether or not utilities are formally in bankruptcy.
A second cost unique to a utility bankruptcy is the cost of coordinating
bankruptcy regulation with nonbankruptcy regulation. The question of
whether the bankruptcy court or a regulatory authority will resolve an issue
does not arise outside bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court and regulatory
authority do not interact outside bankruptcy. The ability of litigants to pit
court against agency, to protest the scope of authority of one vis-a-vis the
other, and to seek duplicate resolution of the same issues does not exist in a
nonbankruptcy setting.
V
PRELUDE TO BANKRUPTCY:

ALLOCATING LOSSES BETWEEN

RATEPAYERS AND INVESTORS

In a utility's financial crisis, regulatory authorities face the threshold
question whether to deny rate increases. They must decide the extent to
which ratepayers and investors should bear the cost of a failed excessively
expensive power plant. If they decide that ratepayers should bear the loss
through higher rates, there will be no immediate utility bankruptcies. If they
decide that investors should bear the loss, rate increases will be denied in
whole or in part, intense postdenial negotiations will ensue, and some
82
bankruptcies will perhaps be initiated.'
179. In re Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1985);
In re Public Serv. Co., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1985).
180. See supra notes 14-15.
181. Id.
182. Denying rate increases does not automatically result in bankruptcy. The parties usually
remain better off negotiating a nonbankruptcy settlement. Unregulated entities in dire financial
condition often achieve satisfactory nonbankruptcy workouts. Denying rate increases would,
however, remove one of the barriers to bankruptcy. It would increase the likelihood of selfinterested creditor collection behavior threatening the going-concern value of a firm. Denial of rate
increases is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for triggering a utility bankruptcy. This fact
simplifies the relationship between the bankruptcy court and the regulatory authority. One is
unlikely to see cases in which the authority wants to raise rates and the bankruptcy court wishes to
keep them lower. An authority with that attitude will have kept the utility out of bankruptcy in the
first place by granting rate increases. A bankruptcy court willing to fiddle with rates will grant rate
increases, not rate decreases, over an authority's objection.
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Given regulators' authority to increase rates, the bankruptcy system's
participation depends on the allocational decision of how to spread a loss
between ratepayers and investors. The allocational decision should not be
distorted by erroneous views of bankruptcy consequences-that is, by
illusions about the effect of bankruptcy on the size of the pie. Because the
role of bankruptcy is so dependent on the allocational decision, it is
appropriate to discuss that decision.
In allocating large unforeseen costs, one approach is to begin with the
analogous problem in an unregulated industry. Answers in that less complex
setting may be used as a starting point for analysis of similar problems in a

regulated environment. Analogous problems, however, provide only a
starting point. In a regulated setting, the competitive forces that shape the
bargain among the parties are lacking.
A.

The Nonregulatory Model and the Nature of the Regulatory Bargain

Assume that a major manufacturer begins building an expensive
manufacturing plant that triples in cost before completion. To recover its
costs, the business must raise prices to its customers. In a competitive
environment, customers will substitute other purchases. The forced sale of
the product to customers at the increased price will not occur. Absent a
government granted monopoly to supply the product, the debtor will either
cease doing business or scale down old obligations, including those attending
the building of the plant, to reduce costs to a competitive level. No effective
mechanism is available to pass mistaken past costs on to customers.
When the government sets the rates at which customers purchase a
commodity and the customers cannot immediately stop using the commodity,
a different situation is presented. Given the obvious result in the
nonregulated industry-that the cost of past mistakes will be borne by past
investors, both creditors and shareholders-should the outcome differ when a
regulated utility cancels an expensive plant or fails to complete it?183
183. For utility regulatory decisions dealing with abandoned power plants, see In re Pacific Power
& Light Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 24, 27-29 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983) (ratepayers not
required to compensate utility for investment in terminated generating plants); In re Pacific Power &
Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 82, 90-92 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982) (limited recovery of
costs from abandonment of plants); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
327, 346-47 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982) (recovery through rates of costs associated with servicing
senior capital but not common equity); In re Bangor Hydro-electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
503, 556-58 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982) (costs of cancelled plant projects allocated between
shareholders and ratepayers); In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386,
396-99 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (recovery through rates of engineering and related charges
of abandoned fossil fuel plant); In rejersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 54,
57 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. 1981) (disallowing recovery of funds used during construction subsequent to
decision to suspend construction); In re Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547,
555-56 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1980) (disallowing costs incurred due to cancellation of construction in
calculating test-year operating expenses used to calculate rates). For court decisions approving
nonrecovery of costs of abandoned plants, see Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 433
A.2d 331 (Me. 1981); Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St.2d 153, 423
N.E.2d 820 (1981).
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There are two principal arguments for a different result. First, fairness
commands a different result because the implicit bargain between investors
and ratepayers differs from the bargain between an unregulated entity and its
customers. The heart of the fairness argument rests on an appeal to
symmetry. Ratepayers, the argument runs, reap the benefit of windfall
increases in utility profits. They therefore should bear the burden of
unexpected losses. This situation differs from the unregulated sector, where
investors receive windfall gains and losses. Second, prudence commands a
different result because of the disastrous long-term effects on the utility and
ultimately on the ratepayers and the society that is spared short-term burdens.
One way to evaluate these arguments is to imagine a bargain between
ratepayers and investors. There are, of course, limits to the extent to which a
contract model can provide answers to difficult regulatory problems, whether
those problems pertain to drafting a comprehensive regulatory statute18 4 or
to an agency's deciding specific cases under a regulatory scheme. Even in the
case of classical express contracts, where one has a clearer sense of who the
players are and what interests they represent, the legal system relies on
supplementary judicial principles to resolve unanticipated disputes.
Nevertheless, the pseudocontractual approach to regulation has been
employed as a model by economists to support regulation itself' 8 5 and has
been invoked in the utility crisis.
Professor Alfred Kahn and others rely on a bargaining model that
generates a result largely favorable to investors. An implicit bargain between
consumers and investors, they argue, requires assuring investors a return on
their investment even if the investment fails.
The essential basis of public-utility regulation is an implicit bargain between
consumers and investors that, in exchange for a monopoly franchise, the company
accepts the strict legal obligation to serve all customers on reasonable terms. This
means that shareholders accept a return on investment equivalent only to something
like the market cost of capital-the minimum that investors must see a reasonable
prospect of earning if they are to put up the necessary funds-along with the duty
conscientiously to anticipate theifuture needs of the public and to make whatever
investments may be necessary in 'order to meet them efficiently.
This means that if the company makes a particularly successful investment-and
there have been many such-the lion's share of the benefit goes to the consumer....
The other side of the bargain is, and has to be, that investors are permitted to earn
that same minimum return also on the dollars that they put into investments that turn
out sour. If they can earn the cost of capital only on the successes and not on the
failures, it follows that they will earn less than the cost of capital on all their dollars,
taken together. And investors
won't play that game once they understand that those
186
are going to be the rules.

184.

See generally Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J.

1537, 1547-56 (1983) (criticizing the "deals" approach to regulation as unable to supply normative
principles but noting its continuing symbolic relevance, and sketching other approaches to
regulation).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 103-111.
186. Kahn, Who Should pay for Power-Plant Duds?, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1985, at 26, col. 3. Accord
Smart, Holding to the Bargain in Utility Regulation, 117 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 4, 4-6, Feb. 6, 1986; Butler, A
Social Compact to be Restored, 116 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 17, 17-21, Dec. 26, 1985.
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Accepting a bargain theory of utility investment, however, does not
necessarily support Professor Kahn's conclusions. As noted above, the
arguments in favor of departing from the nonregulatory result can be
subdivided into (1) an argument from fairness based on symmetry, and (2) an
argument based on long-term economic effects.
B.

The Implicit Bargain: Fairness and Symmetry

The argument based on fairness exerts emotional and intellectual pull. If
ratepayers benefit from unforeseen gains, an implicit bargain model
commands that they bear unforeseen losses.
Accepting this argument at face value has important implications for the
current utility crisis, not all of which support allocating the losses to
ratepayers. The core of the case for allocating losses to ratepayers rests on
the unforeseeability of the losses attributable to failed or excessively
expensive power plants. In a contractual model, foreseeable risks are usually
viewed as having been allocated. Yet the unforeseeability assumption is open
to question.
Investors sometimes advance funds after it becomes clear that there are
risks of noncompletion of power plants. Many recent investors in troubled
utilities are receiving premiums directly attributable to the financial risks of a
troubled nuclear power plant.' 8 7 These investors cannot have it both ways.
They cannot receive a nuclear risk premium until payments on their
investments cease and then claim the shelter of a bargain premised on a near
riskless rate of return. The existence of premiums is also persuasive evidence
that investors do not command the near risk-free investment that Professor
Kahn hypothesizes. The implicit bargain model therefore disqualifies some
investors from the protection the bargain affords against loss attributable to
noncompletion of a nuclear power plant.
There is evidence that the most important risk factor affecting utility
investors, while once ignored, is now expressly considered and allocated by
states. Much of the electric utilities' difficulty stems from deciding who is to
pay the costs of an uncompleted plant. Fifteen or twenty years ago, plants
were routinely completed and brought on-line without major financial
dislocations.' 8 8 The question of whether to pass on to customers the cost of
construction work in progress (CWIP) never arose. Texts of the time do not
mention the concept of including such costs in a utility's rate base.' 8 9
187. Id. (20 to 60%); CAMPAIGN FOR RATEPAYERS' RIGrrs, supra note 63 (rates may double). See
generally Christy & Christy, Who Says Utilities Are Less Risky?, 105 Pun. UlIL. FORT. 11, May 8, 1980
(investors treat utilities as riskier than industrials); Beedles, Are Utilities Less Risky? A Reexamination,
112 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 28, Aug. 4, 1983.
188. C. PHIu..ups, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIEs 322-29 (1984) (in the late 1960's,
construction and capital costs began to increase dramatically, and construction periods were greatly
extended; cost of new plants may now represent a large fraction of firms' assets); Phillips, The

Changing Structure of the Public Utility Sector, 117 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 13, Jan. 9, 1986.
189. See, e.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 157. For an alternative treatment of nuclear construction
costs, allegedly resulting in less rate shock, see Nellis, Allocating Nuclear Power Plant Costs Over Time,
112 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 22, Sept. 29, 1983 (taking account of inflation).
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Recently, however, state legislators and regulators have been expressly
considering the CWIP risk. The issue debated is whether to include costs of
uncompleted plants in a utility's rate base. 190 Inclusion of CWIP in the rate
base was a major issue in the 1978 gubernatorial race in New Hampshire,' 9 '
and states reach varied results on the issue. 9 2 Because of this widespread
express consideration, exclusion of the cost of CWIP from the rate base is no
longer accidental. 9 3 In jurisdictions that follow the practice of exclusion,
recent investors cannot claim that noncompletion of a plant was an
unallocated risk. No party in a true contractual situation can claim
noncompletion to be an unforeseen risk.
Problems with using the implicit bargain model to allocate losses to
ratepayers run more deeply than questioning the unforeseeability assumption
for recent investors. In hypothesizing a bargain between ratepayers and
investors, it is unlikely that an appeal to simple symmetry will produce
anything like what an actual bargain should look like.
The symmetry argument is most appealing when stated in its simplest
form: Those who stand to gain from a set of events should stand to lose from
them. In any real bargaining setting, however, at least two other factors are

taken into account. They are (1) the probability of a gain or loss, and (2) the
magnitude of the gain or loss.
To illustrate, consider ratepayers who are about to strike their implicit
bargain with investors. The ratepayers calculate that, over the life of the
bargain, taking into account all unforeseeable events, they have a ten percent
chance of a five percent rate reduction and a five percent chance of a fifty
percent rate increase. The symmetry argument in its simplest form might
support allocating gains and losses to ratepayers.
But no reasonable ratepayer, knowing of the probability and magnitude
figures, would voluntarily buy 'into such a bargain. The expected return on
the up side is .5%. The expected return on the down side is 2.5%. In
predicting what a voluntary bargain might look like, the symmetry argument is
oversimplified unless it takes account of magnitudes and probabilities. In
190. Grieves & Weaver, A Resolution of the Rate Base Construction Work in Progress Controversy, 109
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 28, Apr. 15, 1982; Comtois, Construction Work in Progress in the Rate Base: A Benefit to
the Consumer, 105 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 19, May 8, 1980; Mattutat, A PragmaticApproach to Construction Work
in Progress, 99 PUB. UrnL. FORT. 31, Mar. 3, 1977; Tiemann, When Should Construction Work in Progress Be
in the Rate Base?, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 43, Nov. 24, 1983.
191. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 188, at 17 n.36. See also Salomon Brothers, Inc., The Elections, the
Electrics-and Recent Rate Cases, Nov. 5, 1982.
192. E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, JR., REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 121 (1982) (35 states

allow inclusion of some portion of CWIP in the rate base); Flaschen & Reilly, supra note 5, at 139
n.12. On the federal level, see Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(reviewing and remanding FERC proposed rule allowing 50% of CWIP in rate base).
193. See Note, supra note 102, at 224. The flip side of including CWIP in the rate base is a utility
accounting practice known as "allowance for funds used during construction" (AFUDC). This allows
utilities to report phantom income based on uncompleted construction work. See Chandy &
Davidson, AFUDC and Its Impact on the Profitability of Electric Utilities, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 34, Aug. 4,
1983. Eliminating AFUDC income has a profound effect on the stated profitability of many utilities.
Id. See also Drennan, What's Right-or Not So Wrong--about AFUDC, 113 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 40, Mar. 15,
1984.
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reality, the expected decreases in rates due to unforeseen improvements are
probably substantially less than the expected increases in rates due to
unforeseen adverse events. The ratepayers are being offered a limited
potential gain and an unlimited potential loss. This may be symmetry, but it
bears little relation to fairness.
Even if one believes that a bargain will lead ratepayers to assume all downside risk, circumstances exist where losses might be allocated to investors.
Even Professor Kahn would not saddle ratepayers with the cost of "grossly
1 94 If it
imprudent" investments. "No investors can legitimately expect that."
is determined that investment in a plant crosses the line between a reasonable
effort to provide good service in the future and an effort to recoup the costs of
what turns out to be an economic mistake, the investors' claim to the benefit
of the implicit bargain ceases.
The implicit bargain, like its explicit contractual cousins, does not dictate
how to account for risks that are unknown to and unforeseen by the parties. It
is a useful model, but it does not necessarily generate answers. Those
investors who have received relatively low returns, presumably those who
invested before the risks of uncompleted plants became known, cannot be
said to have foreseen the future. But neither can their hypothetical
bargaining partners-the ratepayers. In a true bargaining situation, if the
ratepayers had been told that they would bear all the costs of the unknown
without upper limit, they would have rejected the deal.
C.

Long-Term Effects on Utilities, Ratepayers, and Society

Predicting adverse long-term effects of allocating risks to investors is
premised upon an argument that long-run societal welfare will be diminished.
If allocating risks to investors results in long-term harm to investors but
greater long-term benefits to society, however, the long-term effects
argument collapses. No one is forced to invest in utilities. How are the effects
of rates and investment losses on long-term societal welfare to be
determined? The imperfect tools at hand include Posnerian economic
analysis and traditional economic pricing theory. Both are founded on efforts
to maximize long-term societal welfare, and both suggest that welfare will be
maximized by allocating risks to investors.
Judge Richard Posner and others argue that efficient allocation of
resources and maximization of societal welfare command that the contracting
party who is more able to protect itself against loss should bear the risk of that
loss. 195 It is difficult to argue that consumers of electricity are better situated
to protect themselves than investors. Investors may diversify their portfolios
to guard against risk at less expense and effort than consumers seeking to
diversify their portfolios of energy supply. Investments in funds are more
quickly and cheaply shifted than are investments in residences and plant. In
194.

Kahn, supra note 186.

195. E.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.5, at 94 (3d ed. 1986); Posner & Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90 (1977).
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addition, when viewed as groups, investors are more sophisticated than
ratepayers. Both economic efficiency and down-to-earth planning ability thus
suggest that investors are better able to absorb the loss than ratepayers.
Textbook economics suggests that, assuming that dollar values reflect
social utility and social costs, welfare is maximized when the price charged for
goods equals the marginal cost of producing those goods. 19 6 If electricity
rates are higher than the marginal costs of producing electricity (because
ratepayers must pay for sunk costs such as overly expensive power plants or
because new power is cheaper than the power it replaces), users will purchase
less electricity than they ideally should. The lower output associated with
decreased demand now has greater marginal utility to consumers than
marginal cost. The demand for electricity will be artificially depressed, with
negative welfare effects on the state. "The reduced amount of electricity
consumed comes from consumers using less than would make them most
comfortable, consumers and businesses over conserving, and businesses
97
moving out of the state."'
To some extent, regulated industries may require regulated prices that are
above marginal costs, and this is the regulatory tradition. 198 But the
economic efficiency price paid for this imbalance ought to be minimized.
When faced with losses or sunk costs attributable to isolable events, such as
canceled or overly expensive power plants, economic theory suggests no
additional departure from the ideal of price equaling marginal cost. A onetime loss will be visited on the investors, but society's utility will be maximized
by not further increasing prices above the marginal cost of producing
electricity. Imprudent or excessive costs should play no role in determining
that marginal cost.'

99

If investors are to be reimbursed, a subsidy, rather than

20 0
a pricing mechanism that distorts demand, is appropriate.

Against these arguments, what is to be made of the claim that, given a
result favorable to ratepayers, future investors "won't play the game," with

the implication that this is an adverse consequence? Future investors will, of
course, play the game. They will insist on greater returns, however, if they are
to lend to utilities or to some risky subset of utilities. From the ratepayers'
196. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 157, at 63-158; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 17, at 52526.
197. Testimony of M. Bidwell, Chief of Regulatory Research, Office of Research, N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, in In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Case 29069-29070 (Aug. 1985), at 9.
Professor Kahn once put it this way: "[C]onsumers who would willingly have had society allocate
to... production the incremental resources required, willingly sacrificing the alternative goods and
services that those resources could have produced, will refrain from making those additional
purchases because the price to them exaggerates the sacrifices." 1 A. KAHN, supra note 157, at 66-67.
198. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 157, at 124-37. Samuelson & Nordhaus explain this as a need to avoid
chronic losses to firms with decreasing costs. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 17, at 526;
see M. Bidwell, supra note 197, at 10. The decreasing cost trend means that marginal cost will always
be below average cost.
199. Professor Kahn states: "[T]o the extent that maintenance, depreciation, cost of capital, and
various other overhead expenses are not a function of use, they do not belong in short-run marginal
cost or, as such, in the ideal price." 1 A. KAHN, supra note 157, at 72 (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 130.
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point of view, the trade-off is between current electric rate increases estimated
to be between twenty to two hundred percent 20 ' and future increases based
on the future increase in the cost of capital.
In an idealized economic model, ratepayers' increased future costs
precisely reflect the increased risk to investors attributable to avoiding current
large rate increases. Ratepayers have fewer risks, investors have more, and
ratepayers pay the cost of their safety in the future. It is as if over time
ratepayers purchase an insurance policy against massive immediate rate
increases. The long-run costs to ratepayers balance out in relief from shortterm rate increases, less a small premium for the "insurance." But ratepayers
avoid the likely substantial social costs of massive rate increases, such as
industries being forced out of business by rate shock and consumers
foregoing necessary utility services.
The long-run costs to investors also balance out. Investors learn of the
increased risks but adjust future investment rates upwards. Some risk-averse
investors are driven from utility investments, but the effects on the system are
probably no greater than those that would attend allocating greater risk to
ratepayers. The investors who will not play the game provide no reason for
allocating the loss to the ratepayers.
The bargain model, Posnerian law and economics, and traditional
economics may all point to visiting power plant losses on investors. They
certainly do not point firmly toward substantial rate increases. Despite the
theories, however, competitive markets often do not allocate the costs of
unforeseen risks according to an ironclad economic principle. Private parties
often decide that in the long run, both are better off if the costs of unforeseen
risks are shared. 20 2 Contracts are regularly renegotiated without legal
compulsion. Courts sometimes require adjustment of long-term contracts
when circumstances change. Whether because of a Macneilian long-term view
of contractual relations or because of the costs of litigation, compromises are
common.
Thus, a fully developed bargaining model probably will not generate onesided results. A complete analysis of the hypothetical bargain, which would
be heavily dependent on the reasonable expectations applicable to a
particular utility, its investors, and its ratepayers, might support compromise
solutions under which ratepayers and investors share the costs of failed
plants.2 0 3 The matter need not be resolved here, however. If it is accepted
201. Kahn, supra note 186 (20% to 60%); CAMPAIGN FOR RATEPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 63
(rates may double); Letter from Jim Lazar to Theodore Eisenberg (Feb. 5, 1986) (rates in the
Northwest have increased 200% since 1979 owing to dead Washington Public Power Supply System
plants and another 200% owing to live WPPSS plants and other cost increases associated with actual
utility service).
202. E.g., Macaulay, supra note 103, at 58-59; Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal
Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833, 837; Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial
Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 489-96, 556-57 (1985). But see Gillette, Commercial Rationality
and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985).
203. See Samuels, A Consumer View on FinancingNuclear PlantAbandonments, 115 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 24,
Jan. 10, 1985 (suggesting that consumers pay higher rates in exchange for equity interest in the
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that losses should not, as the implicit bargain advocates argue, automatically
be imposed on ratepayers, then there is a more modest bankruptcy-related
point to be made. If some substantial rate increases should otherwise be
denied, they should not be granted out of fear of possible bankruptcy
consequences. Ratemakers who believe they have a sound economic or social
basis for denying rate increases should not be duped into granting them by
fear of an unknown dark corner of the law.
V
CONCLUSION:

OTHER BANKRUPTCY-REGULATORY INTERACTIONS

This article has emphasized the relationship between bankruptcy law and
one regulated industry-the utility industry. Other possible relationships
between regulation and bankruptcy reorganization may be shaped by
questionable assumptions similar to those affecting the utility industry.
First, there is an interesting relationship between bankruptcy law and
"general" regulation that protects a financially burdensome relationship.
Regulation protecting a financially burdensome status quo differs from the
regulatory structures emphasized here because of the general applicability of
the regulatory scheme. Public service commissions and financial regulators
regulate specific industries. Their regulatory authority is not generally
applicable. Nearly all industries, however, are subject to federal labor
legislation, federal securities laws, federal tax laws, and other provisions
administered by the regulatory bureaucracy. One or more of these regulatory
provisions may be a source of the debtor's financial difficulty and could in
some sense lead to bankruptcy.
For example, federal labor laws make the collective bargaining agreement
between management and workers a kind of "law of the case." The
agreement becomes the legal blueprint for union-management relations. The
regulation afforded by the National Labor Relations Act protects whatever
deal the parties have hammered out. In doing so, federal regulation supports
one aspect of the status quo-that embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement. If the agreement contains a financially burdensome wage
package, then regulation may be said to have become part of the financially
20
troubled company's problem.

4

utility); Urban, Allocating the Costs of Failed or Abandoned Projects of Regulated Public Utilities, 113 PUB.
33, May 24, 1984, (put burden only on equity in existence during earlier time to avoid
affecting future costs of capital to the utility).
If the preferred substantive solution to a particular utility's crisis is to share the burden of an
abandoned nuclear plant, it may be fairer to spread the ratepayers' part of the cost among a group
larger than that served by the particular troubled utility. Independent of nuclear power plants, the
utility business itself has become regional in orientation. Parts of every state except New York
participate in at least one multistate power pool. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINIsTmTION, DEP'T OF
ENERGY, INTERuTILrrY BULK POWER TRANSACrIoNs 80 (1983) (chart of DOE electric regions in U.S. as
ofJune 1, 1982). If costs are allocated on a regional basis, the social cost of any rate shock will be
diminished.
204. The labor-management battleground supplied the most celebrated instance of the pressure
to modify nonindustry-specific regulation that protects the status quo-in this case a collective
UTIL. FORT.
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Second is the relationship between bankruptcy law and regulatory
requirements that are not a cause of a debtor's financial difficulty, but that
may hinder successful reorganization if not relaxed. Here, the problem is not
that a labor or tax law will lead to bankruptcy. Instead, it is that applying the
law to the debtor who is attempting to reorganize will hinder the
reorganization. The first category leads a debtor to bankruptcy; the second
prevents the debtor from successfully emerging from bankruptcy. The
process of reorganization triggers the regulatory scheme, and the question
arises whether to suspend the normal regulatory rules of the game.
Several regulatory mechanisms illustrate this theme. In the absence of
special rules, the fact of reorganization may generate income tax
consequences that impede reorganization. A reorganization often requires
the issuance of new securities that would normally be subject to federal
securities law regulation.2 0 5 Many reorganizations trigger the need to deal
with a debtor's pension plan. The problems of coordinating bankruptcy law
with ERISA have proven to be substantial. This phenomenon is not limited to
tax, securities, and pension laws. Any change in the debtor's operations
might trigger the operation of some regulatory mechanisms. Reorganizing
20 6
airlines, for example, might need new airport or safety permits.
Regardless of the specific relationship at issue, claims made under the
bankruptcy banner should be viewed skeptically. The nuclear utilities have
used the fear of bankruptcy in part as a scare tactic to shape the political
environment in which they operate. Once in bankruptcy, significant debtors
will not hesitate to claim the need for relief from traditional securities, tax,
labor, and environmental requirements. Because they will have shifted the
debate into a remote, complex corner of the law, their chances to persuade
when they should not be persuasive may increase. In each case, it is necessary
to analyze in detail the benefits and burdens of bankruptcy and the need to
undermine important regulatory requirements in the name of avoiding
bankruptcy or achieving a successful reorganization.

bargaining agreement. Managements claiming the existence of burdensome labor contracts have
seen bankruptcy law as a possible means of eliminating high labor costs. They have filed under
chapter 11, rejected their collective bargaining agreements, and secured lower wage scales to restore
the company's financial health. Unions have responded by litigating over the standard to be satisfied
before the bankruptcy court can authorize rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. The
resulting case, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), led to congressional enactment of
section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The net result is that management may reject collective
bargaining agreements but usually not without judicial scrutiny. Similar use of bankruptcy may be
envisioned to escape the burden of environmental regulation that imposes substantial cleanup costs
on businesses. See generally Hennigan, Accommodating Regulatory Enforcement and Bankruptcy Protection, 59
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1985).
205. See generally Morgan, Application of the Securities Laws in Chapter 11 Reorganizations Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 861.
206. In re American Central Airlines, Inc., 52 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (enjoining
O'Hare Airport from depriving debtor of 20 of its 36 air landing slots); In re Air Illinois, 13 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 606 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1985) (allowing FAA to revoke debtor's landing and take-off
privileges at O'Hare Airport after filing of bankruptcy petition).

